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A PATH TO DATA-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT 
 
Jacob T. Elberg* 
 
Abstract 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has a long-stated goal of 
encouraging companies to engage in what the author refers to as 
“compliant behaviors”—maintenance of an effective pre-existing 
compliance program, post-enforcement adoption of an effective 
compliance program, cooperation with a government investigation, and 
self-disclosure of misconduct. Substantial DOJ guidance over the past two 
decades, along with the concrete incentive structure of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, have increasingly made clear to organizations 
when and how such behaviors will be rewarded in criminal matters. 
Recently, DOJ has made transparency and clarity regarding the benefit of 
compliant behaviors a priority in calculating and announcing criminal 
resolutions. With respect to civil False Claims Act (“FCA”) settlements, 
however, meaningful formal DOJ guidance on the effect of compliant 
behavior only arrived in 2019. More significantly, DOJ’s treatment of 
compliant behavior in civil cases, in contrast to that in the case of criminal 
resolutions, has appeared inconsistent and certainly opaque. This lack of 
clear implementation philosophy is particularly problematic in the area of 
health care, an industry for which the FCA is the primary tool for 
government action in response to misconduct. While much has been 
written on the systemic efficiencies—or lack thereof—that DOJ’s 
enforcement practices bring to the activities of regulated industries, this 
is the first article to use data to ask whether DOJ has a governing practice 
concerning civil settlements, or whether instead, its settlement practices 
fail to match its stated principles. 
For decades, even as resources devoted to health care compliance by 
market participants have skyrocketed and DOJ has pressed corporate 
entities to engage in compliant behaviors, the health care industry and the 
defense bar have expressed skepticism regarding the actual payoff they 
might realize by engaging in those behaviors. DOJ’s response has been a 
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series of public statements amounting to, “trust us, they matter.” Until 
now, the health care industry has been without any mechanism to test those 
assurances. 
In response to changes in the tax code, however, DOJ made 
adjustments in 2018 to its practice of disclosing information regarding 
FCA settlements—changes that have shaken loose data that provides an 
opportunity to test DOJ’s claims of rewarding compliant behaviors in civil 
cases. The author is the first and thus far the only person to have identified 
and analyzed this newly available data. Examination of this data 
demonstrates that wide-ranging, structural changes are necessary. The 
data raises substantial questions about: the quantum of credit given for 
cooperation; conduct DOJ values in resolving FCA cases; and the degree 
of consistency in cases settled by U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the 
country. For example, analysis of the data reveals inconsistent benefits for 
cooperation. Cases where defendants self-disclosed misconduct or 
cooperated were often not treated more leniently than cases where 
defendants did not self-disclose or cooperate, and a review of more than 
100 settlements did not find a single instance in which DOJ purported to 
give an entity a reduction based on its pre-existing compliance program. 
At the same time, DOJ appears to be greatly rewarding defendants for 
agreeing to settle—highlighting concerns both with regard to whether 
DOJ is achieving adequate deterrence and with regard to whether the 
FCA’s potential penalties are coercing settlements. And the data appears 
to show significant variation in settlement positions depending on the 
identity of enforcing DOJ component, with cases handled by DOJ’s Civil 
Division in Washington, D.C. treated more leniently than cases handled 
solely by U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country. 
With the data now public—and at a moment in time when DOJ is 
emphasizing transparency and clarity in rewarding compliant behaviors 
in the resolution of criminal cases—DOJ’s corporate health care 
enforcement regime is at a crossroads. Without change in this area, DOJ 
risks undercutting its efforts at encouraging compliant behaviors in one of 
DOJ’s primary enforcement areas. No longer left in the dark about the 
impact of compliant behaviors in calculating FCA resolutions, the health 
care industry may be less likely to continue investing in compliance 
programs at the same rate, to cooperate with government investigations, 
and especially to self-disclose misconduct to the government. The analysis 
reveals that a detailed structure of DOJ’s calculations in FCA settlements, 
with calculations transparent in each FCA resolution, is needed to 
accomplish DOJ’s goal of encouraging cooperation and investment in 
compliance programs, as well as to provide an assurance that like cases 
are treated alike. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has long stated its desire to incentivize 
companies to engage in what I refer to as “compliant behaviors”—having an 
effective pre-existing compliance program, adopting an effective compliance 
program as a remedial measure, cooperating with a government investigation, and 
self-disclosing misconduct to the government. Scholars have raised questions as to 
the effectiveness and costs of rewarding compliant behaviors, and some have argued 
DOJ should cease its efforts to reward compliant behaviors.1 This Article does not 
weigh into that debate, and instead addresses the current state of enforcement. 
Whether right or wrong to do so, DOJ has decided that compliant behaviors are 
beneficial and should be rewarded. When it comes to the handling of criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, substantial DOJ guidance over the past two 
decades, alongside the concrete incentive structure of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, have increasingly made clear to organizations when and how such 
behaviors will be rewarded. When it comes to the impact of compliant behaviors on 
the resolution of civil False Claims Act (“FCA”) settlements, however, meaningful 
DOJ guidance only arrived in 2019, and it still lacks a clear incentive structure. This 
is particularly problematic in the area of health care, an industry for which the FCA 
is the primary tool for government action in response to corporate misconduct.  
Until recently, the lack of a visible structure for resolution of civil cases was 
masked by the fact that the system required no transparency from DOJ as to the 
bases for its FCA resolutions.2 In 2018, however, that changed, forcing DOJ to give 
a glimpse behind the curtain. Because a change in the tax law now required DOJ to 
begin revealing what portion of resolutions constitutes restitution and what portion 
constitutes additional punishment beyond paying restitution, the law effectively 
requires DOJ to reveal how harshly each act of corporate misconduct is treated. This 
Article analyzes more than 115 corporate health care FCA settlements between 
February 2018 (when DOJ began including the restitution information in FCA 
                                                   
1 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 688 (1997) (examining 
various regimes for punishing corporate defendants, including that of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, and concluding that they do not “adequately create proper incentives 
for companies to monitor, investigate, and report employee wrongdoing”); Sean J. Griffith, 
Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2127 
(2016) (arguing that government should reduce investigation costs by requiring companies 
to install compliance functions and that “government enforcement agents have structural 
incentives to mandate excessive compliance” (citing Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing 
Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 991–99) (2009)); Miriam Hechler Baer, 
Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 903, 905–10 (2011) (exploring the costs and 
benefits of cooperation credit in cases involving individuals).   
2 See Amendment of 1986 Code, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13306, 131 Stat. 2054, 2126–28 
(2017) (requiring DOJ to provide, for the first time, information regarding the portion of civil 
settlement agreements which constitute restitution). 
1172 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
agreements) and June 2019—an analysis of particular salience given DOJ’s May 
2019 guidance regarding benefits for compliant behaviors in FCA cases. 
Based on this analysis, detailed below, there is reason for skepticism that DOJ 
is valuing compliant behaviors in the way it claims and that DOJ utilizes any 
consistent framework in resolving FCA cases. Examination of data reveals a lack of 
uniformity in resolving FCA cases across different DOJ components and an absence 
of evidence that DOJ rewards compliant behaviors. Instead, the resolutions 
demonstrate that DOJ, while failing to reward compliant behaviors, has routinely 
discounted penalties without explanation and to a far greater extent than is seen in 
criminal resolutions in exchange for defendants’ agreement to settle. 
The reality exposed by the forced transparency resulting from the tax law 
change seems to stand in stark contrast to DOJ’s May 2019 FCA guidance. This gap 
is more notable because it comes in the midst of a sustained and well-publicized 
effort by DOJ’s Criminal Division to provide true transparency as to the impact of 
compliant behaviors – in particular, cooperation and self-disclosure. With industry 
and the defense bar increasingly expecting proof from DOJ, and the limited FCA 
data now available providing fuel for those skeptical of DOJ’s assurances, DOJ’s 
corporate health care enforcement is at a crossroads, creating a pressing need for a 
rethinking of DOJ policy in this critical area.  
 
I.  GUIDANCE RE: IMPACT OF COMPLIANT BEHAVIORS IN CRIMINAL RESOLUTIONS 
 
In criminal cases, there is substantial guidance and transparency as to the 
impact of compliant behaviors both from within DOJ and through the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. In fact, it is primarily through that DOJ-generated, criminal-
focused guidance that the government has made clear it views compliant behaviors 
as significant in the fight against fraud and believes that the way to encourage 
compliant behaviors is to take them into account in determining the appropriate 
outcome when fraud is uncovered. 
 
A.  Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
 
Most significantly, the Justice Manual (“JM”)3—a publicly available resource 
containing DOJ policies and procedures—makes clear that compliant behavior 
should be a significant factor in determining whether and in what form to bring a 
criminal prosecution against a business organization. The Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations4 were added to the JM following the 
                                                   
3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/justice-
manual [https://perma.cc/ZLG8-LPP9] (“The JM was previously known as the United States 
Attorneys’ Manual (USAM). It was comprehensively revised and renamed in 2018.”). For 
simplicity, this Article refers to the document as the “JM,” even when referring to time 
periods when it was known as the “USAM.” 
4 Id. § 9-28.000 (2008) [hereinafter Corporate Prosecution Principles], https://www. 
justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations 
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publication of an August 2008 memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Mark 
Filip5, which also updated the Corporate Prosecution Principles. The Corporate 
Prosecution Principles describe the factors criminal prosecutors should consider 
when investigating a corporate entity and making determinations regarding whether 
to bring charges and when negotiating potential resolutions. The Corporate 
Prosecution Principles regularly mark the framework for presentations by defense 
counsel to prosecutors and for internal memoranda by DOJ prosecutors seeking 
approval to charge or resolve cases. 
The Corporate Prosecution Principles section of the JM notes that “the 
prosecutor must weigh all of the factors normally considered in the sound exercise 
of prosecutorial judgment: the sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of success 
at trial; the probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other consequences of conviction; 
and the adequacy of noncriminal approaches,” but that there are additional factors 
present when considering business organizations.6 The section goes on to list eleven 
factors: 
 
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm 
to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing 
the prosecution of corporations for particular categories of crime; 
 
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including 
the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate 
management; 
 
3. the corporation’s history of similar misconduct, including prior 
criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it; 
 
4. the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its 
agents; 
 
5. the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing 
compliance program; 
 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/BHY8-ZAMB]. 
5 Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Principles 
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GZE-52EL]. The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations are commonly referred to as the “Filip Factors”—an ironic development, 
given that the Filip Memo noted that his revision of the prior Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations “was truly a collective effort,” and “should not bear 
the name of any particular individual at the Department, as prior iterations sometimes 
became known,” lest they be read to “imply[] that Department policy is subject to revision 
with every changing of the guard.” Id. at 2. 
6 Corporate Prosecution Principles, supra note 4, § 9-28.300(A).  
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6. the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing; 
 
7. the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to 
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to improve 
an existing one, to replace responsible management, to discipline or 
terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the 
relevant government agencies; 
 
8. collateral consequences, including whether there is disproportionate 
harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not 
proven personally culpable, as well as the impact on the public 
arising from the prosecution; 
 
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement 
actions; 
 
10. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the 
corporation’s malfeasance; and  
 
11. the interests of any victims.7 
 
Of the eleven Corporate Prosecution Principles, four aim squarely at rewarding 
compliant behaviors: “the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation 
of its agents,” “the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing 
compliance program,” “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing,” and the corporation’s remedial efforts “to implement an effective 
compliance program or to improve an existing one.”8 
Originally issued more than 20 years ago—in June 1999 through a 
memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder—the Corporate 
Prosecution Principles have, through numerous iterations, generally listed the same 
factors in place today.9 The Holder Memo instructed prosecutors to consider each of 
the four compliant behaviors, as did later iterations issued by Deputy Attorney 
General Larry D. Thompson in 2003, by Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty 
in 2006, the Filip Memo in 2008, and another iteration issued by Deputy Attorney 
General Sally Quillian Yates in 2015 in the context of DOJ’s efforts to increase 
“Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.”10 
                                                   
7 Id.; see also id. §§ 9-28.400–9-28.1300. 
8 Id. § 9-28.300; see also id. §§ 9-28.700, 9-28.800, 9-28.900, 9-28.1000. 
9 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Bringing 
Criminal Charges Against Corporations to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys (June 
16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/K2CY-E3XJ]. 
10 Id.; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Dep’t 
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The changes from the Holder Memo through today centered around DOJ’s 
expectations for cooperation, with each iteration making adjustments to the 
cooperation factor while retaining all four compliant behaviors.11 
                                                   
Components & U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo], 
https://web.archive.org/web/20030403065859/http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_org
anizations.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6Q5-JYZG]; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter 
McNulty Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnult 
y_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DE9-CM2P]; Filip Memo, supra note 5; Memorandum from 
Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Individual Accountability 
for Corporate Wrongdoing to Assistant Att’ys Gen., Dirs., & U.S. Att’ys (Sept. 9, 2015) 
[hereinafter Yates Memo], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download. 
[https://perma.cc/JWS6-7WQG]. The Holder Memo listed eight principles for consideration. 
Principle 10 was added in 2003, and in 2015 the two related factors addressing cooperation 
—“the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents,” and “the 
corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing”—were broken out into two 
separate principles, after having been combined into a single principle in prior versions of 
the Corporate Prosecution Principles. Salley Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., Remarks at American Banking Association and American Bar Association Money 
Laundering Enforcement Conference (Nov. 16, 2015), in JUST. NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-
remarks-american-banking-0 [https://perma.cc/QYX6-MZCW]. 
11 The Holder Memo and Thompson Memo directed prosecutors to take into account 
whether the entity under investigation waived the attorney-client privilege and/or advanced 
legal fees to employees who had engaged in misconduct. DOJ’s consideration in evaluating 
cooperation of entities’ decisions regarding waiver of attorney-client privilege and regarding 
advancing fees to employees generated substantial controversy, and eventually a federal 
district court decision holding that prosecutors had violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights of employees by causing their employer, KPMG, to condition payment of their legal 
fees on their willingness to be interviewed by the government. See United States v. Stein, 
435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 541 F.3d 130, 136 
(2d Cir. 2008). Also in 2006, the Senate considered the Attorney Client Privilege Protection 
Act of 2006, which sought to prevent prosecutors from considering the waiver of attorney-
client privilege in making charging decisions. S. 30, 109th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2006). Although 
the proposed bill was not passed by the Senate, the McNulty Memo soon followed, 
instructing prosecutors that they could seek privileged information only “when there is a 
legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law enforcement obligations.” 
McNulty Memo, supra note 10. The McNulty Memo reaffirmed the four compliant 
behaviors as factors to be considered, and again focused on cooperation in revising the 
Corporate Prosecution Principles. Id. The Filip Memo for a third time amended the Corporate 
Prosecution Principles to make adjustments to the cooperation factor. Filip Memo, supra 
note 5. The Filip Memo again retained all four compliant behaviors, while focusing its 
amendments on cooperation and removing consideration of privilege waiver and legal fee 
advancement from the cooperation analysis in making charging decisions. Id.; see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud 
Section (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download 
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B.  Additional DOJ Guidance re: Compliant Behaviors 
 
In recent years, DOJ has only increased its public emphasis on compliant 
behaviors and statements tying compliant behaviors to increased DOJ leniency. 
Through numerous statements and issuance of guidance, DOJ has sought to 
incentivize companies to engage in compliant behaviors by providing guidance to 
industry as to how DOJ would 1) evaluate and reward investment in compliance 
programs; and 2) evaluate and reward cooperation and self-disclosure. DOJ has 
emphasized its belief in the impact of transparency: 
 
Transparency about the types of corporate practices and programs 
that the Department of Justice values has the . . . benefit of reinforcing 
real-world outcomes that we desire as an institution. By demystifying the 
considerations commonly confronted by white-collar prosecutors, our 
hope is that companies will have the information and security they need to 
invest fully in compliance on the front end, and to make good decisions in 
the face of misconduct on the back end.12 
 
As to corporate compliance programs, DOJ has taken a number of steps to send 
the message to industries that evaluating compliance programs—to determine 
whether and how much reward should be given—is a priority for DOJ. In November 
2015, DOJ announced that the Fraud Section of DOJ’s Criminal Division retained a 
full-time compliance expert to aid DOJ’s evaluation of compliant behavior to inform 
criminal prosecution decisions.13 While DOJ announced the elimination of the 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/5QVY-A3ES]. The Filip Memo noted its “principal revisions . . . 
concern[ed] what measures a business entity must take to qualify for the long-recognized 
‘cooperation’ mitigating factor, as well as how payment of attorneys’ fees by a business 
organization for its officers or employees, or participation in a joint defense or similar 
agreement, will be considered in the prosecutive analysis. Much of the remainder of the 
[Corporate Prosecution] Principles [were left] unchanged.” Filip Memo, supra note 5. 
12 Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the 
Global Investigations Review Live New York (Oct. 8, 2019), in JUST. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019) 
[hereinafter Global Investigations Review Live], https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assist 
ant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-remarks-global-investigations [https://per 
ma.cc/2ANT-Y297]. 
13 U.S. Dep’t of Just., New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained, supra note 11 
(“Among her duties as a consulting expert, [Hui] Chen will provide expert guidance to Fraud 
Section prosecutors as they consider the enumerated factors in the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual concerning the prosecution of business entities, including the existence and 
effectiveness of any compliance program that a company had in place at the time of the 
conduct giving rise to the prospect of criminal charges, and whether the corporation has taken 
meaningful remedial action, such as the implementation of new compliance measures to 
detect and prevent future wrongdoing. Chen will help prosecutors develop appropriate 
benchmarks for evaluating corporate compliance and remediation measures and 
communicating with stakeholders in setting those benchmarks.”). 
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position in October 2018, DOJ simultaneously announced a program to create “a 
workforce better steeped in compliance issues across the board,” through a 
“combination of diverse hiring and the development of targeted training 
programs.”14 In February 2017, DOJ’s Criminal Division published guidance as to 
what DOJ looks for in evaluating corporate compliance programs and then published 
an updated version of that guidance in April 2019, and then again in June 2020.15 
While the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs noted that many of its 
topics also appear in the JM, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, or other sources, its 
publication represented another clear attempt on the criminal side to increase 
guidance and transparency to encourage compliant behavior. 
DOJ guidance has been perhaps even more prevalent when it comes to the 
standards and benefits regarding cooperation and self-disclosure. In addition to the 
repeated adjustments to the Corporate Prosecution Principles described above, DOJ 
has issued supplementary guidance. The Yates Memo identified six steps DOJ 
would take to “strengthen [DOJ’s] pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing,” the 
first of which focused on detailing under what circumstances corporations can 
qualify for cooperation credit under the Corporate Prosecution Principles.16 
As it has focused on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) matters, DOJ has 
formalized additional incentives to engage in compliant behavior, focusing on 
cooperation and self-disclosure, while also reinforcing DOJ’s commitment to 
rewarding remedial investments in compliance programs. In an effort to increase 
transparency regarding the benefits of cooperation and self-disclosure even beyond 
that flowing from the Corporate Prosecution Principles, described above, and U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines guidance, detailed below (both of which, of course, apply 
with equal force to FCPA maters), DOJ supplemented the JM with the FCPA 
Resource Guide in 2012 (published in collaboration with the SEC).17 It also created 
the FCPA Pilot Program in 2016, and then formalized the FCPA Pilot Program into 
the Corporate Enforcement Policy, also inserting it into the JM in 2018, all with an 
eye towards incentivizing compliant behavior through increased guidance and 
transparency.18 
                                                   
14 Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at NYU 
School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement Conference on 
Achieving Effective Compliance (Oct. 12, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (Oct. 13, 2018) 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-
remarks-nyu-school-law-program [https://perma.cc/P2GB-AD4X]. 
15 See CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS (2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download 
[https://perma.cc/Z2RH-WY9P]. 
16 Yates Memo, supra note 10. 
17 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE 
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files 
/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFR9-8AB8].  
18 Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at 34th International 
Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017) in JUST. NEWS (Nov. 29, 
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Under the Corporate Enforcement Policy (which DOJ announced in 2018 
would be binding as to FCPA matters and used as “nonbinding guidance” by the 
Criminal Division in other areas of white-collar enforcement beyond the FCPA),19 
companies who voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, cooperate, and appropriately 
institute remedial measures, will presumptively receive a declination of prosecution, 
absent aggravating circumstances involving the seriousness of the offense or the 
nature of the offender.20 Even where a criminal resolution is warranted for a 
company that makes a voluntary self-disclosure, DOJ will apply the FCPA 
Corporate Enforcement Policy and agree to or recommend to a sentencing court a 
50% reduction off of the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range, and 
generally will not require the appointment of an outside monitor.21 Where the 
company does not make a self-disclosure but does cooperate and appropriately 
remediate, DOJ will support up to a 25% reduction off of the low end of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines fine range.22 Notably, as detailed below, these deductions are 
in addition to the already substantial role compliant behaviors play in calculating the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range. 
                                                   
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-
remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign [https://perma.cc/SFX3-BU97] (“We expect 
the new policy to reassure corporations that want to do the right thing. It will increase the 
volume of voluntary disclosures, and enhance our ability to identify and punish culpable 
individuals. . . . We want corporate officers and board members to better understand the costs 
and benefits of cooperation.”).  
While operating outside of DOJ, the SEC has similarly sought to provide guidance that 
compliant behavior will be rewarded. The SEC has done this through a report (commonly 
referred to as the Seaboard Report) in 2001, which sought to explicitly detail its methodology 
for determining penalties, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION 
STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENOFORCEMENT 
DECISIONS (2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm [https://perma 
.cc/L6MF-LLY7]; a statement commonly referred to as the Penalties Statement in 2006, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STATEMENT OF THE SEC CONCERNING FINANCIAL PENALTIES 
(2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [https://perma.cc/GSL5-JH9K]; a 
cooperation initiative in 2010, which among other things made the Seaboard Report part of 
the SEC Enforcement Manual, Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces 
Initiative to Encourage Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations 
(Jan. 13, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm [https://perma.cc/N3MX 
-ZFFW]; as well as publication of the FCPA Resource Guide in 2012. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
& U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 17. 
19 John P. Cronan, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at Practising Law 
Institute Event (Nov. 28, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-john-p-cronan-delivers-remarks-
practising-law [https://perma.cc/Z89T-Q7BE]. 
20 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-47.120(1) (2019), https://www.justice.gov 
/jm/jm-9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977 [https://perma.cc/83SR-R5KJ]. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. § 9-47.120(2). 
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In addition to referencing the Corporate Prosecution Principles, the Corporate 
Enforcement Policy provides additional, detailed guidance regarding what 
constitutes self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.23 The defense bar has 
understandably viewed these various guidance documents as efforts “to promote 
predictability and transparency in white collar enforcement and to clarify the 
benefits of a responsible corporate approach to misconduct . . . .”24 In formalizing 
the Corporate Enforcement Policy into the Justice Manual, DOJ made clear it 
intended to increase transparency with the hope of encouraging compliant behaviors, 
in particular voluntary disclosures.25 
 
C.  United States Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The factors included in the Corporate Prosecution Principles and reinforced 
through additional DOJ guidance are, of course, far from novel. Most notably, 
several of the factors are also included in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. While the 
Corporate Prosecution Principles provide factors to be considered, they are 
explicitly intended to aide in a process that remains largely art and not science, 
noting that prosecutors have “substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, 
and even whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”26 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines go a step further, detailing explicit and 
concrete calculations as to Determining the Fine for Organizations. Under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, a series of factors are used to arrive at a Culpability Score, 
which then translates to a minimum (as low as 0.05) and maximum (as high as 4.0) 
fine multiplier, each of which is multiplied by the base fine (frequently the gain to 
the organization from the offense or the loss from the offense caused by the 
organization) to create the minimum and maximum of the guideline fine range.27 
Factors related to compliant behavior are central to calculation of the 
Culpability Score. As a result, a potential guideline fine can decrease by 40–80% 
based on cooperation with the government’s investigation, 60–120% based on the 
existence of a pre-existing effective compliance program, 100–200% based on a 
                                                   
23 Id. § 9-47.120(3). 
24 John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene & David B. Anders, The DOJ’s Updated 
Guidance on Corporate Compliance Programs, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (May 14, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019 
/05/14/the-dojs-updated-guidance-on-corporate-compliance-programs/ [https://perma.cc/X 
SL7-HSEH]. 
25 Rosenstein, supra note 18 (“[The Corporate Enforcement Policy] will increase the 
volume of voluntary disclosures . . . .”). 
26 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.200, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations [https://perma.cc/EHU9-
RV2K] (revised July 2020). 
27 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.4–2.7 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS76-9GJU]. 
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self-disclosure, or 160–320% in the case of an entity with a pre-existing effective 
compliance program and a self-disclosure.28 
Notably, the calculations related to compliant behaviors are significantly 
greater than adjustments made based on simple acceptance of responsibility. The 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines multiplier reduction for acceptance of responsibility is 
only 20–40%—smaller than adjustments based on the size of the organization and 
the role within the organization of the responsible individuals.29 Under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, the reduction for a defendant organization’s self-disclosure 
is five times the reduction for mere acceptance of responsibility, and the reductions 
for cooperation or for having had an effective compliance and ethics program in 
place are two times and three times the acceptance of responsibility deduction, 
respectively.30  
Numerous factors, including considerations mirroring sentencing factors 
detailed in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3572(a), are then used to determine the amount 
of a fine within (or outside of) the applicable guideline range.31 In the context of a 
significant corporate resolution, the Culpability Score deductions relating to 
compliant behavior can easily make a concrete and visible difference of tens or even 
hundreds of millions of dollars in a criminal resolution.32 
                                                   
28 Id. Cooperation with the investigation leads to a deduction of 2 points from the 
culpability score, having an effective pre-existing compliance program leads to a deduction 
of 3 points, and self-disclosure a deduction of 5 points. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1),(g)(1), (g)(2). Based 
on the Minimum and Maximum Multipliers listed in U.S.S.G., id. § 8C2.6, a 2-point 
deduction would reduce the minimum multiplier by 0.4 and the maximum multiplier by 0.8; 
a 3-point deduction would reduce the minimum multiplier by 0.6 and the maximum 
multiplier by 1.2; a 5-point deduction would reduce the minimum multiplier by 1.0 and the 
maximum multiplier by 2.0; and an 8-point deduction would reduce the minimum multiplier 
by 1.6 and the maximum multiplier by 3.2. Id. § 8C2.6. 
29 Id. § 8C2.5(g)(3) (subtracting 1 point from the culpability score for acceptance of 
responsibility); id. § 8C2.5(b) (adding between 1-5 points based on the size of the 
organization and the role within the organization of the responsible individuals). 
30 Id.  
31 Id. § 8C2.8. 
32 See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 8, 13, United States v. Olympus Med. Sys. Corp., No. 
2:18-cr-00727-SRC (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2018), www.justice.gov/usao-nj/press-release/file/111 
8431/download [https://perma.cc/2G44-L7NV]. In December 2018, Olympus Medical 
Systems Corporation (“Olympus”) entered into a criminal plea agreement with DOJ, 
pursuant to which Olympus agreed to pay a fine of $80 million (plus criminal forfeiture of 
$5 million). According to the Plea Agreement, the payment was based on a culpability score 
of 7—reflecting a 2-point deduction for cooperation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(2)—
leading to a multiplier range of 1.4 to 2.8 and a Guidelines Fine Range of $46.2 to $92.4 
million. If not for the cooperation credit, Olympus’s culpability score would have been 9 and 
its multiplier range would have been 1.8 to 3.6, leading to a Guidelines Fine Range of $59.4 
to $118.8 million and a fine of $103.4 million if the fine was similarly approximately 87% 
of the Maximum. If Olympus had not only cooperated but self-disclosed, its culpability score 
would have been 4 and its multiplier range would have been 0.8 to 1.6, leading to a 
Guidelines Fine range of $26.4 to $52.8 million and a fine of $45.9 million, if the fine was 
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The combined impact of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and DOJ policy is 
substantial transparency as to how DOJ calculates criminal fines and how compliant 
behaviors impact those calculations. One recent example, typical of the level of 
transparency in criminal resolutions, was DOJ’s resolution of criminal FCPA 
charges against TechnipFMC plc through a Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
(DPA).33 In the DPA, DOJ included the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines calculations in 
explaining how the fine was calculated, noting the base fine was $141,040,000, and 
the Culpability Score was ten, with the calculation laid out in the DPA. 
 
Culpability Score.34 Based upon USSG § 8C2.5, the culpability score is 
10, calculated as follows: 
 
(a) Base Culpability Score 5 
 
(b)(1) the organization had 5,000 or more employees 
 and an individual within high-level personnel 
 of the organization participated in, condoned, 
 or was willfully ignorant of the offense +5 
 
(c)(2) Prior History less than 5 years +2 
 




                                                   
similarly approximately 87% of the Maximum. Thus, the act of cooperation presumably 
saved Olympus approximately $23 million, and Olympus could presumably have saved 
$57.5 million had it self-disclosed and cooperated. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5(g)(1)–(2), 8C2.6 (2018).  
33 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. TechnipFMC plc, 19-cr-278 
(E.D.N.Y 2019) [hereinafter TechnipFMC DPA], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1177316/download [https://perma.cc/WRH3-A9TT]; see also Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Just., TechnipFMC Plc. and U.S.-Based Subsidiary Agree to Pay Over $296 
Million in Global Penalties to Resolve Foreign Bribery Case (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/technipfmc-plc-and-us-based-subsidiary-agree-pay-over-
296-million-global-penalties-resolve [https://perma.cc/MPH9-YGWU] (“‘Today’s 
resolution takes aim at the scourge of bribery, but does so in a fair and evenhanded way,’ 
said Assistant Attorney General [Brian A.] Benczkowski. ‘It is a testament to the strength 
and effectiveness of international coordination in the fight against corruption, but also an 
acknowledgement that the Department is fully committed to reaching fair and just resolutions 
with companies that fully cooperate and remediate.’”). 
34 TechnipFMC DPA, supra note 33, at 8. 
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Under the Sentencing Guidelines, it is explicit that the reduction of two points 
consisted of one point based on the company’s acceptance of responsibility and an 
additional point based on the company’s cooperation.35 
DOJ went on to provide the fine range ($282,080,000–$564,160,000) based on 
the Culpability Score and stated in the agreement that, if not for the defendant’s 
remedial measures and cooperation, DOJ would have viewed the appropriate fine as 
“a point near the midpoint of the applicable [ ] fine range” because the defendant 
was a recidivist.36 DOJ provided details regarding the defendant’s remedial 
measures and cooperation and made explicit that TechnipFMC “received full 
cooperation and remediation credit . . . [a] 25 percent reduction for cooperation and 
remediation,” leading to an ultimate fine of $296,184,000.37 The defendant—and 
others throughout industry and the defense bar—can see that DOJ reduced the fine 
by 25% (more than $98 million) based on TechnipFMC’s cooperation and 
remediation. 
 
II.  THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
 
A.  The FCA Is the Government’s Primary Health Care Fraud Enforcement Tool 
 
While for some industries, criminal prosecutions are DOJ’s primary 
enforcement mechanism, in the health care industry, that honor has long been held 
by civil cases brought under the False Claims Act.38 In Fiscal Year 2019 alone, DOJ 
                                                   
35 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5(g)(2)–(3) (2018). 
36 TechnipFMC DPA, supra note 33, at 5. 
37 Id. at 3–5. 
38 See, e.g., Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government’s Stick 
and Carrot Approach to Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 327–30 (1999) 
(referring to the FCA as “the [g]overnment’s [p]rimary [w]eapon [a]gainst [f]raud” and 
pointing to the FCA’s qui tam provision as a primary reason for its growth); Pamela H. Bucy, 
Growing Pains: Using the False Claims Act to Combat Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 
57, 59–60 (1999) (concluding that the FCA’s qui tam provision, lower mens rea requirement, 
and lower burden of proof, combined with the fact that most health care providers have 
substantial assets, makes the FCA a “potent and appropriate weapon to use against fraudulent 
health care providers”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes 
Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 
239, 247 (1999) (noting DOJ’s increasing reliance on the FCA to prosecute health care 
offenses). 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Office of Inspector 
General (“OIG”) maintains a separate authority to bring civil monetary penalty (“CMP”) 
actions based on a wide range of program violations. Civil Monetary Penalties and 
Affirmative Exclusions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEATH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/ 
enforcement/cmp/index.asp [https://perma.cc/DA4D-QT39] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
However, the size of CMP actions and resulting publicity from those actions has paled in 
comparison to FCA recoveries. See Stephen Payne, John Partridge, Jonathan Phillips, Julie 
Rapoport Schenker, Claudia Kraft, Maya Nuland, Stevie Pearl, Susanna Schuemann, Margo 
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recovered $2.6 billion from settlements and judgments in FCA cases involving the 
health care industry, representing the tenth consecutive year that DOJ’s civil health 
care fraud settlements and judgments have exceeded $2 billion.39 Between 2010 and 
2019, DOJ has recovered $25.3 billion from settlements and judgments in FCA cases 
involving the health care industry.40 With eye-catching numbers year after year, 
FCA recoveries have been DOJ’s primary method of targeting organizations for 
health care enforcement. 
DOJ has noted that, particularly in the health care arena, FCA cases are a 
primary mechanism not only for punishing misconduct but also for deterring fraud. 
In the December 2018 press release announcing the Fiscal Year 2018 recoveries, 
DOJ noted, “the Department’s vigorous pursuit of health care fraud prevents billions 
[] in losses by deterring those who might otherwise try to cheat the system for their 
own gain.”41 
 
B.  Background and Structure of the FCA 
 
Congress originally enacted the FCA during the Civil War in response to 
concerns regarding fraud against the government by contractors selling “sick mules, 
lame horses, sawdust instead of gunpowder, and rotted ships with fresh paint.”42 
While the FCA remains an important tool for enforcement in government 
contracting, over the last thirty years, it has been primarily used to address health 
care fraud. In Fiscal Year 2019, for example, the $2.6 billion recovered by DOJ from 
FCA cases involving the health care industry was roughly 87% of the $3 billion 
recovered in total by DOJ from FCA cases.43 
                                                   
Uhrman & Madelyn La France, 2018 Year-End FDA and Health Care Compliance and 
Enforcement Update – Providers, GIBSON DUNN 9–11 (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.gibson 
dunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2018-year-end-fda-health-care-compliance-enforce 
ment-update-providers.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ9C-JHKU] (showing 135 CMP recoveries 
for $71 million in 2018 compared with 813 total civil actions, including FCA suits, for $2.91 
billion in fiscal year 2018). 
39 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion 
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-
cases-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/WM26-VCV2]. 
40 Id. (providing figures for 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS – HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/1080696/ 
download [https://perma.cc/AV58-KP29] (providing figures for 2010–21, 2018). 
41 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers over $2.8 Billion 
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-
act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/B5VP-SKCW]. 
42 Id. (quoting Assistant Attorney General Jody Hunt). 
43 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers 2018, supra note 41. 
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The FCA imposes penalties on anyone who “knowingly presents . . . a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the Federal Government.44 A violation 
of the FCA “includes four elements: falsity, causation, knowledge, and 
materiality.”45 In the context of the FCA, to act “knowingly” means that a person 
“has actual knowledge[,]” “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the 
information[,]” or “acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the 
information[,]” but does not require proof of intent to defraud.46 
The FCA provides that a person who violates the FCA “is liable to the United 
States Government for a civil penalty of not less than [$11,665] and not more than 
[$23,331] . . . plus three times the amount of damages which the Government 
sustains because of the act [of the person violating the FCA].”47 Damages (referred 
to as single damages) are generally the amount of money the United States paid as 
a result of the false claim.48 Thus, recovering single damages can be seen as making 
the Government whole.49 
The Supreme Court previously described treble damages (three times the 
amount of damages) as “essentially punitive in nature,” but later clarified that “treble 
damages have a compensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to 
punitive objectives.”50 Whether characterized as remedial or punitive, it is clear that 
the prospect of having to repay not only the amount wrongfully obtained but instead 
three times the amount wrongfully obtained plus penalties used by DOJ in an effort 
to deter wrongful conduct in the first place. The only limitation on recoveries in the 
FCA statute is the inclusion of a Reduced Damages provision, which is triggered by 
self-disclosure and full cooperation before initiation of any government 
investigation into the misconduct.51 Where the Reduced Damages criteria are 
satisfied, the Government is entitled to recover only double damages.52 The FCA’s 
statutory language (“is liable”) renders treble damages and penalties mandatory 
unless the Reduced Damages provision applied, and while courts have placed some 
                                                   
44 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). 
45 See United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(citing Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016); 
Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc, 659 F.3d 295, 304–05 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
46 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
47 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G); 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2020) (providing updated inflation-
adjusted figures for penalties after November 2, 2015). 
48 See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1943). 
49 As discussed below and recently recognized by DOJ, because of lost interest and other 
factors, a recovery actually must be beyond single damages to truly make the government 
whole. 
50 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784 (2000); 
Cook Cty. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003). 
51 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). As detailed below, DOJ’s application of the FCA has 
rendered this provision essentially meaningless; however, the existence of the Reduced 
Damages provision indicates a clear intent by the statute’s drafters to reward self-disclosures. 
52 Id. (“[T]he court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the 
Government sustains because of the act of that person.”). 
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constitutional limits on the number of available penalties, there is virtually no check 
on the Government’s ability to recover, at least, treble damages.53 
DOJ has long trumpeted its ability to obtain treble damages plus penalties. One 
2018 DOJ press release announcing an FCA settlement went so far as to note that 
treble damages are the “typical[]” liability under the FCA.54 But DOJ is not required 
to demand treble damages (or penalties) in resolving an FCA case. While industry 
and the defense bar have long believed that DOJ rarely seeks treble damages, 
notably, there is no guidance or transparency from DOJ as to what constitutes a 
standard settlement or what factors influence what DOJ will demand.55 This is in 
stark contrast to the extensive and public disclosures by DOJ on its settlement 
policies in criminal cases. 
The rise in FCA cases, particularly in the area of health care fraud, can be traced 
back to amendments to the FCA in 1986, which provided substantial incentives for 
whistleblowers (referred to as “relators”) to file qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the 
government alleging false claims.56 Relators can recover between fifteen and thirty 
percent of the proceeds of a resolution, depending on whether the government elects 
to take the case over from the relator (this is referred to as the government 
“intervening”) or if the relator proceeds without government intervention, and also 
depending “on the extent to which the person [i.e., the relator] contributed to the 
prosecution.”57 
In Fiscal Year 2019, relators filed 633 such qui tam suits and $2.1 billion of the 
$3 billion recovered in Fiscal Year 2019 was attributable to qui tams.58 The 
government paid out $265 million to relators.59 Although only roughly one-quarter 
                                                   
53 See, e.g., United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and penalties may in some cases 
limit the application of treble damages and penalty awards); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.120 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-4-4000-commercial-
litigation#4-4.120 [https://perma.cc/393X-BTH8] (“Courts may limit the imposition of 
statutory civil penalties as a violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, such as where 
the civil penalty violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
54 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Medical Equipment Company Agrees to Pay $5.25 
Million (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edky/pr/medical-equipment-
company-agrees-pay-525-million-resolve-allegations-fraudulent-claims [https://perma.cc/ 
UEP7-7EFM]. 
55 See, e.g., Brian C. Elmer & Alan W.H. Gourley, FCA Settlements: A Practical Guide 
for Defense Counsel, CROWELL & MORING LLP, https://www.crowell.com/documents/doc 
assocfktype_presentations_440.pdf [https://perma.cc/52E2-F2PG] (last visited Aug. 17, 
2020) (“In settling, DOJ does not insist on treble damages, although it will not acknowledge 
any specific policy to settle for less than treble damages. It does insist that, at a minimum, 
the government must be compensated for its entire loss, and it usually strives for at least 
double damages.”). 
56 31 U.S.C. § 3730. 
57 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). 
58 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers 2018, supra note 41. 
59 Id. 
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of filed qui tams are successful, they regularly account for a large majority of FCA 
actions and recoveries.60  
In addition to bringing information to the government’s attention and driving 
substantial recoveries, the mechanics of the FCA result in relators and their counsel 
effectively determining who within DOJ will work on a particular case. Qui tams 
are filed in one of the ninety-four federal districts and served upon both the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office in that district and the U.S. Attorney General in Washington, 
D.C.61 Health care FCA cases are generally handled either by an individual U.S. 
Attorney’s Office working in conjunction with the Commercial Litigation Branch 
of DOJ’s Civil Division or by an individual U.S. Attorney’s Office without the 
involvement of DOJ’s Civil Division. By controlling the decision of where to file an 
FCA suit, relators’ counsel thus controls which U.S. Attorney’s Office will be 
assigned to work on the case. 
Although data is sparse and precise numbers are unknown, there is agreement 
that while hundreds of FCA cases are resolved each year, remarkably, few do so via 
trial.62 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices have the authority to settle claims where the gross 
amount of the original claim does not exceed $10 million.63 DOJ’s Civil Division—
the Commercial Litigation Branch in the case of health care FCA cases—must 
approve settlements above those amounts unless DOJ’s Civil Division delegates 
responsibility for the case to the individual U.S. Attorney’s Office.64 
 
C.  Civil Resolution Guidance 
 
As detailed above, there is a long and detailed history documenting DOJ’s 
commitment to rewarding compliant corporate behavior in criminal resolutions. 
Until recently, however, there was virtually no formal guidance regarding how DOJ 
                                                   
60 BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY 
STOLTZFUS JOST, ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, BRIETTA R. CLARK, ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, ROBERT 
GATTER, JAIME S. KING & ELIZABETH PENDO, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 994 (8th ed. 2018). 
61 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.110 (2019), https://www.justice.gov 
/jm/jm-4-4000-commercial-litigation [https://perma.cc/3BD8-7QJ6]. 
62 There is no available data tracking the number or percentage of FCA cases which end 
in trials, but there is widespread agreement that the number and percentage are low. See Joan 
H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1413 (2002) (citing Leon Aussprung, Fraud and Abuse: Federal 
Civil Health Care Litigation and Settlement, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 3 (1998) (describing the 
FCA cases which go to trial as a “small minority”)); Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 264 
n.142 (noting lack of data and providing anecdotal evidence that few FCA cases are tried).  
63 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL, CH. 46, 
REDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO COMPROMISE CIVIL CLAIMS (2016) [hereinafter DOJ 
CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-46-
redelegation-authority-compromise-civil-claims [https://perma.cc/PVD5-FKGJ]. 
64 See id.  
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would consider and reward compliant behaviors in resolving civil cases.65 The U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines are, of course, inapplicable to civil cases, leaving DOJ 
unconstrained in electing what policy to apply and how to calculate appropriate 
resolutions, beyond the Reduced Damages provision of the False Claims Act.66 
Before the issuance of the Yates Memo, there was substantial skepticism within 
the industry and the defense bar as to whether DOJ had a policy of rewarding 
compliant behaviors in civil cases at all. It was thus notable that the Yates Memo, 
which focused heavily on the link between criminal and civil investigations, 
explicitly instructed civil prosecutors to take corporate cooperation into account.67 
None of the pre-Yates Memo iterations or discussions of the Corporate Prosecution 
Principles mentioned the impact of the Corporate Prosecution Principles on civil 
cases handled by DOJ or required DOJ’s civil prosecutors to take the factors into 
account.68 
Still, while the Yates Memo made clear that civil prosecutors were required to 
reward cooperation, the memo and its aftermath offered virtually no guidance as to 
how cooperation was to be taken into account—a reality certainly noticed by 
                                                   
65 Corporate Prosecution Principles, supra note 4, §§ 9-28.700–9-28.1000 (establishing 
compliant behavior factors starting in 2015). Within DOJ, the Civil Division and Criminal 
Division have separate leadership and reporting structures, with oversight for both Civil and 
Criminal non-existent until the level of Deputy Attorney General—just one level below the 
Attorney General. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ORGANIZATION CHART (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart [https://perma.cc/6W85-RYY6].  
In most U.S. Attorney’s Offices, oversight for both Civil and Criminal generally does 
not occur until the level of the U.S. Attorney or the U.S. Attorney’s Executive Office. At 
least one U.S. Attorney’s Office, the District of New Jersey, has combined oversight for both 
Civil and Criminal Health Care matters under the leadership of one Unit Chief, but that 
structure is the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Medical Device Company Will Pay $646 Million for Making Illegal Payments to Doctors 
and Hospitals in United States and Latin America (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/medical-equipment-company-will-pay-646-million-making-illegal-payments-doct 
ors-and-hospitals [https://perma.cc/HUQ5-86N3]. 
DOJ encourages parallel proceedings, and the Yates Memo specifically encourages 
criminal and civil prosecutors to be in regular communication. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE 
MANUAL, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL, CH. 27, COORDINATION OF PARALLEL 
CRIMINAL, CIVIL, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/organization-and-functions-manual-27-parallel-proceedings 
[https://perma.cc/3HX6-26D5]; Yates Memo, supra note 10. Consistent with the Corporate 
Prosecution Principles, there is no clear guidance as to when a case should be treated as a 
civil case, a criminal case, or both. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL §9-28.000 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizat 
ions [https://perma.cc/6RVG-EMED]. 
66 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). 
67 Yates Memo, supra note 10. 
68 See Filip Memo, supra note 5; Holder Memo, supra note 9; Thompson Memo, supra 
note 10; McNulty Memo, supra note 10; Yates Memo, supra note 10. 
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industry and the defense bar.69 Both in relation to the Yates Memo and since, DOJ 
made statements in support of a compliant behavior discount in FCA cases, at least 
as it pertains to cooperation. In particular, following the publication of the Yates 
Memo in 2015, the Justice Manual chapter on civil cases was updated to include a 
reference to the requirements for business organization cooperation to earn credit in 
civil cases.70 The reference, however, provided only one example—that “the 
Department’s position on ‘full cooperation’ under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(2), is that, at minimum, all relevant facts about responsible individuals 
must be voluntarily provided. . .” referring to an entity’s ability to take advantage of 
the statutory provision limiting FCA damages to double actual damages in the 
context of a voluntary self-disclosure.71 
In a series of public statements in 2018 and early 2019, DOJ affirmed that the 
corporate benefits in FCA cases for engaging in compliant behaviors go beyond the 
self-disclosure provision of the FCA. In June 2018, Acting Associate Attorney 
General Jesse Panuccio delivered a speech affirming DOJ’s commitment to reward 
corporate defendants for “invest[ing] in strong compliance measures” and for 
“genuine cooperation,” noting that “the extent of the discount will depend on the 
nature of the cooperation and how helpful it is to the Department’s investigation, 
including our pursuit of individual wrongdoers.”72 Then in January 2019, Deputy 
Associate Attorney General Stephen Cox delivered a speech at an FCA conference 
in which he assured the audience that “the Department is committed to rewarding 
companies that invest in strong compliance programs and who cooperate with our 
investigations into wrongdoing.”73 
                                                   
69 Gejaa Gobena, Mitch Lazris, Peter S. Spivack & Karla Aghedo, DOJ Embraces a 
More Realistic Position on Corporate Cooperation, 33 No. 05 WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIME 3, WL 124214 (2019) (noting that “the impact of cooperation on the calculation of 
civil FCA settlement amounts remains a mystery” in an article by Hogan Lovells US LLP 
attorneys, three of whom previously worked for DOJ); Laura McLane & Rebecca C. Martin, 
Cooperation in the Eye of the Beholder: DOJ Official Bill Baer Elaborates on Cooperation 
in False Claims Act and Other Civil Enforcement Matters, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY 
(Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.mwe.com/insights/doj-elaborates-on-cooperation-in-fca/ 
[https://perma.cc/69DH-9NX8]. This article by McDermott, Will & Emery attorneys, one of 
whom previously worked for DOJ, notes that “critically, defendants continue to be in the 
dark about what benefits cooperation genuinely confers” when faced with prosecution. Id. 
70 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-3.100(3) (2018), https://www.justice.gov 
/jm/jm-4-3000-compromising-and-closing#4-3.100 [https://perma.cc/NQ5Q-E5ZN]. 
71 Id. 
72 Jesse Panuccio, Acting Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the 
American Bar Association’s 12th National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui 
Tam Enforcement (June 14, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/speech/acting-associate-attorney-general-jesse-panuccio-delivers-remarks-american-
bar [https://perma.cc/G4L5-J8L9]. 
73 Stephen Cox, Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the 2019 
Advanced Forum on False Claims and Qui Tam Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2019), in JUST. NEWS, 
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-associate-attorney-general-
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Finally, in May 2019, through a statement from Assistant Attorney General 
Jody Hunt and accompanying changes to the Justice Manual, DOJ issued for the first 
time, formal guidance regarding rewards for compliant behavior in FCA cases.74, 75  
While DOJ has not said so explicitly, indications are that the “Guidelines for 
Taking Disclosure, Cooperation, and Remediation into Account in False Claims Act 
Matters” are intended to represent transparency regarding already existing policy 
rather than a change in policy, and commentators have described it as simply 
“providing more insight into the Justice Department’s process.”76 The 
announcement accompanying the FCA Guidance referred to the FCA Guidance as 
“formal guidance,” stating that the FCA Guidance “explain[s] the manner in which 
the Department of Justice awards credit to defendants who cooperate with the 
Department during a False Claims Act investigation,” and noting that “[t]he formal 
policy . . . identifies the type of cooperation eligible for credit”—language consistent 
with clarification and transparency regarding an already existing policy.77 And while 
Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General Claire McCusker Murray gave a 
speech two weeks after the release of the FCA Guidance in which she twice referred 
to the FCA Guidance as a “new policy” and also referred to the FCA Guidance as a 
“False Claims Act reform,” in the same speech she provided two examples of the 
policy in action—resolutions announced six months and two months, respectively, 
prior to the issuance of the FCA Guidance.78 
The FCA Guidance “identif[ies] factors that will be considered and credit that 
will be provided” based on compliant behaviors.79 For self-disclosure, cooperation, 
and remediation, the FCA Guidance provides examples of conduct that would 
constitute voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.80 
The substance of the FCA Guidance with regard to compliant behaviors largely 
mirrors the Corporate Prosecution Guidelines. Two exceptions, however, are worth 
noting. First, the FCA Guidance includes “[a]dmitting liability or accepting 
                                                   
stephen-cox-delivers-remarks-2019-advanced-forum-false [https://perma.cc/4H6J-SAKY]. 
74 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Issues Guidance on False Claims Act Matters and 
Updates, Justice Manual (May 7, 2019) [hereinafter FCA Guidance], https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/department-justice-issues-guidance-false-claims-act-matters-and-updates-just 
ice-manual. [https://perma.cc/QGR2-7F9V]. 
75 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.112 (2019) https://www.justice.gov/jm/ 
jm-4-4000-commercial-litigation#4-4.112. [https://perma.cc/59SR-YUGY]. 
76 Jacob Rund, Justice’s False Claims Guide Meant to Spur Cooperation, BL (May 9, 
2019, 4:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-governance/justices-false-
claims-guide-meant-to-spur-cooperation?context=search&index=0 [https://perma.cc/F2KU 
-PBEF]. 
77 FCA Guidance, supra note 74. 
78 Claire McCusker Murray, Principal Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Remarks at the Compliance Week Annual Conference (May 20, 2019), in JUST. NEWS at 3–
6 (May 20, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-principal-deputy-associate-
attorney-general-claire-mccusker-murray-compliance [https://perma.cc/PW5B-EC7L]. 
79 FCA Guidance, supra note 74. 
80 Id. 
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responsibility for the wrongdoing or relevant conduct,” among the “Forms of 
Cooperation.”81 This is unlike in the criminal context, where acceptance of 
responsibility is a prerequisite for cooperation credit rather than an example of 
cooperation, both under DOJ criminal policy and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
(where acceptance of responsibility without cooperation is separately rewarded).82 
In addition, as detailed in Sections III.C. and F., below, it appears that DOJ has been 
rewarding defendants for their willingness to settle FCA cases, regardless of whether 
they are accepting responsibility by making admissions or otherwise acknowledging 
wrongdoing. 
Second, for the existence of a pre-existing compliance program, the FCA 
Guidance does not state that it will lead to a reduction in the multiplier and instead 
notes “the Department may take into account the prior existence of a compliance 
program in evaluating a defendant’s liability under the False Claims Act. For 
example, the Department may consider the nature and effectiveness of such a 
compliance program in evaluating whether any violation of law was committed 
knowingly.”83 It is unclear whether this statement is simply DOJ noting the 
relevance of a pre-existing compliance program for a legal determination of whether 
the conduct was committed “knowingly”—an element under the FCA—or is meant 
to imply a benefit is available to defendants whose conduct is deemed to meet the 
elements of the FCA despite having a meaningful pre-existing compliance 
program.84 If solely the former, this would seemingly represent an unintentional 
departure from long-standing DOJ policy (also found in the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines) rewarding pre-existing compliance programs—policy which DOJ has 
reiterated in strong terms as recently as November 2019: “The corporate compliance 
function is in some ways more important than the prosecution function. It can 
actually prevent misconduct in the first place through robust systems of controls, 
and by fostering a culture where compliance is valued and rewarded.”85 
                                                   
81 Id. 
82 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5(g)(2)–(3) (2018).  
83 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 53, § 4-4.112. 
84 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). 
85 Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the 20th 
Annual Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Compliance Congress (Nov. 6, 2019), in JUST. 
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-
benczkowski-delivers-remarks-20th-annual-pharmaceutical [https://perma.cc/R9RY-
BQHP]. 
It would not, however, be the first time in recent memory DOJ has seemed to stray from 
emphasizing the importance of pre-existing compliance programs. See Andrew Spalding, 
Restoring Pre-Existing Compliance Through the FCPA Pilot Program, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 
519, 520–21 (2017) (lamenting DOJ’s neglecting to incentivize investments in pre-existing 
compliance under the FCPA Pilot Program). The lack of attention to pre-existing compliance 
noted by Spalding with regard to the FCPA Pilot Program was not addressed when the Pilot 
Program was formalized into the Corporate Enforcement Policy in November 2017. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 20, § 9-47.120. 
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The FCA Guidance states that credit for compliant behaviors will “[m]ost often 
. . . be exercised by reducing the penalties or damages multiple sought by the 
Department.”86 A clear parallel exists between a reduction of the FCA multiplier and 
a reduction of the criminal fine multiplier. In certain respects, the FCA Guidance is 
thus in line with the criminal-side trend towards increased transparency in rewarding 
compliant behaviors. The Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General 
acknowledged as much in her May 2019 speech when she referred to the FCA 
Guidance as “tak[ing] a page from the Corporate Enforcement Policy.”87 That is true 
in so far as the FCA Guidance offers clarity as to how compliant behavior will be 
judged and as to what compliant behavior will be rewarded. But the Corporate 
Enforcement Policy in the criminal context applies benefits for engaging in 
compliant behaviors, which are specifically articulated ahead of time and explicitly 
identified at the time of resolution, while the FCA Guidance applicable in the civil 
context neither provides the former nor promises the latter. 
Even with the FCA Guidance, and unlike the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and 
the Corporate Enforcement Policy, no DOJ guidance provides information as to how 
multipliers are calculated in the absence of compliant behaviors, nor offers any 
specifics as to what amount or percentage a resolution will be reduced based on 
compliant behaviors. Without specific information, industry and the defense bar 
have thus still been left with attempting to use individual resolutions to glean what 
form compliant behavior “credit” would take, an impossible task given that 
individual cases are, by their nature, highly fact-specific. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
 
A.  The Multiplier & the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act 
 
Though substantial attention has been paid to FCA cases, lack of DOJ 
transparency has resulted in a complete absence of empirical analysis regarding how 
DOJ wields the tremendous power provided to it under the FCA. Until 2018, it was 
virtually impossible to analyze FCA settlements and come away with any 
understanding of what impact the government’s view of the defendant’s compliance 
program or level of cooperation (or anything else) had on the government’s 
calculations. In reaching and announcing FCA settlements, DOJ historically did not 
disclose the amount of “single damages” or the multiplier used to arrive at the 
ultimate resolution. Even the defendant could be left in the dark, as FCA settlements 
did not necessarily involve a meeting of the minds between the government and the 
defendant as to the method of calculation. 
For example, when the Department of Justice reached the largest health care 
fraud settlement in U.S. history—a parallel criminal-civil resolution with 
GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK) in 2012 requiring GSK to pay $3 billion, the criminal 
plea agreement included detailed calculations showing how DOJ arrived at the $1 
                                                   
86 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.120, supra note 53. 
87 McCusker Murray, supra note 78. 
1192 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
billion figure GSK paid as fine and forfeiture pursuant to the criminal plea, while 
the three separate Civil Settlement Agreements (CSAs) totaling $2 billion in 
payments under the FCA provided no information about whether that figure 
represented single damages, treble damages plus penalties, or somewhere in 
between.88 As significantly, like the TechnipFMC DPA described above,89 the GSK 
criminal plea agreement identified the specific deduction made based on GSK’s 
cooperation in the government’s investigation and acceptance of responsibility, and 
the criminal plea agreement was clear that GSK did not receive a deduction for self-
disclosure or for having an effective pre-existing compliance program.90 None of the 
three GSK CSAs provided any information about what role GSK’s compliant 
behaviors, or lack of compliant behaviors, played in DOJ’s arrival at the $2 billion 
civil figure.91 Just as the GSK criminal plea agreement’s transparency was typical of 
criminal DOJ resolutions, the complete lack of transparency in the GSK CSAs was 
typical of civil DOJ resolutions.92 
That changed, however, with the 2017 passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.93 
Section 13306 of the Act made clear that business organizations can deduct only 
                                                   
88 Compare Plea Agreement at 3–6, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, No. 1:12-
cr-10206 (D. Mass. July 02, 2012) [hereinafter Plea Agreement, GlaxoSmithKline], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/plea-agreement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PH5H-RYYC], with Avandia Civil Settlement Agreement at 6–7, United 
States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, No. 1:12-cr-10206 (D. Mass. 2012), https://www.justice. 
gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/avandia-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5 
A5-K5ZQ], Nominals Civil Settlement Agreement at 8–9, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline 
LLC, No. 1:12-cr-10206 (D. Mass. June 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/nominals-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH5H-RYYC], and 
Off Label Civil Settlement Agreement at 6–8, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, No. 
1:12-cr-10206 (D. Mass. 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012 
/07/02/off-label-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2C2-6BNB]. 
89 See supra Section I.C. 
90 See Plea Agreement, GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 88, at 3–4. 
91 See Avandia Civil Settlement Agreement, supra note 88, at 6; Civil Settlement 
Nominals Agreement at 8–9, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC No. 1:12-cr-10206 (D. 
Mass. July 2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/nom 
inals-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W6L-MNLN]; Off Label Civil Settlement 
Agreement at 6, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC No. 1:12-cr-10206 (D. Mass. July 
2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/off-label-
agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2C2-6BNB].  
92 I have not found any CSAs prior to early 2018 which included any information about 
how DOJ calculated the settlement figure. 
93 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). The Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act was the most sweeping reform of the Tax Code since the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986. William G. Gale, Hilary Gelfond, Aaron Krupkin, Mark J. Mazur, & Eric Toder, 
Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Preliminary Analysis, TAX POLICY CTR. 1 (June 13, 
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ES_20180608_tcja_summ 
ary_paper_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XC9-HS88]. While much attention has been paid to 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s impact on individual and corporate tax liability, and its setting 
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those portions of settlements paid to the government that they can establish were 
paid as restitution or expended to come into compliance with the law.94 (A defendant 
settling for single damages can thus deduct the entire cost of the settlement, while a 
defendant settling for treble damages can only deduct one-third.) Significantly, the 
statute requires that the money must be specifically identified as such in a court order 
or settlement agreement and imposes on the government an obligation to provide 
notice to the Internal Revenue Service and the settling party of the restitution amount 
contained within civil settlements.95 In response, DOJ has regularly been including 
the “restitution” figure in FCA CSAs since early 2018, from which the multiplier 
used in each particular case can be calculated.96 With that, for the first time, 
systematic analysis of DOJ resolutions is possible. 
The analysis which follows attempts to fill in this gap by examining resolutions 
along with multiple different factors. 
 
B.  Methodology 
 
I have attempted to review the CSAs from all civil-only FCA settlements 
entered into between health care business organizations and DOJ between early 
2018 and May 31, 2019, as well as the accompanying DOJ press releases and other 
public statements made by DOJ or the settling defendants.97 Where possible, I have 
tracked: the dollar amount of the resolution; the amount of the resolution which 
constituted restitution under the CSA; whether the case stemmed from the filing of 
a qui tam; the U.S. Attorney’s Office involved in the case; whether DOJ’s 
Commercial Litigation Branch was involved in the case; whether there were indicia 
of acceptance of responsibility; and whether there were indicia of compliant 
behaviors. Some CSAs were not available. Several available CSAs did not reference 
a restitution figure or contained arrangements which made determination of the 
intended multiplier impossible, and, unfortunately, there is no mechanism to 
determine whether there have been any CSAs that my analysis did not identify. My 
                                                   
at zero dollars, the amount of the shared responsibility payment imposed as a penalty on 
those who failed to ensure that they had minimum essential coverage to satisfy the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, there has been little focus on the 
Section most relevant to this Article. 
94 § 13306, 131 Stat. at 2126–28. 
95 Id. at 2127. 
96 See, e.g., Civil Settlement Agreement at 4, United States v. Dermatology Assocs. of 
Cent. N.Y., No. 5:15-cv-00315-TJM-ATB (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.justice. 
gov/usao-ndny/press-release/file/1117066/download [https://perma.cc/ZZY5-XZT3]. 
97 The four identified FCA resolutions with criminal components were excluded from 
the analysis, as it would be impossible with current information to account for the impact of 
the monetary components of the criminal resolution (fine and forfeiture) on the civil 
resolution. For example, it is impossible to know whether an FCA amount was reduced 
because of the monetary components of the criminal resolution. Regardless, given the small 
number, including those resolutions would not have had a notable impact on the analysis. 
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analysis includes 118 CSAs, including 89 CSAs for which the restitution and thus 
the multiplier could be determined.98 
 
C.  Average Multiplier 
 
Despite DOJ’s statements regarding the potential for treble damages plus 
penalties under the False Claims Act, for the 89 CSAs for which the multiplier could 
be determined, the mean multiplier was 1.78, and the median multiplier was 2.0. Of 
those eighty-nine CSAs, seventy-eight (88%) were at or below double damages—
forty-four were at double damages, and thirty-four were between 1.0-1.9, seemingly 
confirming widespread sentiment amongst industry and the defense bar that 
settlement multipliers are rarely above double damages.99 
 
Table 1: Multipliers 
Multiplier # of CSAs 
> 2.0 11 
2.0 44 
< 2.0 34 
 
There were only eleven CSAs above 2.0, and neither the CSAs nor the DOJ 
press releases explained why they had a higher than default multiplier. If those 
eleven organizations engaged in conduct DOJ wishes to disincentivize, the lack of 
transparency prevents any such general deterrence from taking place. 
Notably, this distribution renders the FCA’s Reduced Damages provision, 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2), largely meaningless, and it is not surprising that none of the 
CSAs referenced the provision.100 With settlement details now public, business 
organizations know that they do not generally need to self-report, or even cooperate 
                                                   
98 A table summarizing the data is included at Appendix 1. 
99 Multipliers were rounded to the nearest tenth for purposes of categorization. Thus, 
any multiplier below 2.05 but greater than or equal to 1.95 was considered 2.0 for purposes 
of categorization. 
Some may question whether DOJ is accurately reporting restitution figures, or whether 
DOJ and defendants may in some cases be agreeing on a resolution figure and then engaging 
in additional negotiation regarding the percentage attributable to restitution. By its definition, 
“restitution” should not be impacted by litigation risk, compliant behaviors, or other factors. 
Even if one questions the integrity of the restitution figures, however, given that the signaling 
impact of FCA multipliers are geared towards general deterrence rather than specific 
deterrence, and because there is no reason to suspect such negotiations would be more 
prevalent in certain categories of cases than in others, any such horse trading would not 
impact the analysis or its conclusions. 
100 As explained in section II.B., supra, the FCA’s Reduced Damages provision 
eliminates penalties, and caps the Government’s recovery at double-damages, in the case of 
self-disclosure and full cooperation. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). There is little benefit to a 
statutory entitlement to a double-damages settlement in exchange for self-disclosure when 
virtually all cases are settled at or below double-damages. 
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or accept responsibility, to obtain a settlement at or below double-damages. This 
necessarily eliminates the provision’s intended incentive.  
Given that the FCA Guidance was released during the time period of my 
analyses and followed after months of DOJ discussion regarding the guidance 
announcement, I also examined whether there was a change in the multipliers over 
time. As can be seen visually in Chart 1, there are no indicia that multipliers changed 
during this time. 
 




Because the execution and announcement of CSAs generally occur months 
after an agreement in principle to the key terms, including the dollar amount and the 
restitution amount, and CSAs did not consistently identify when such agreements in 
principle were reached, it is impossible to separate pre-FCA Guidance CSAs from 
post-FCA Guidance CSAs in a way that assures accuracy. It will be useful to repeat 
this analysis in the future. 
Also notable amongst the data is the fact that sixteen defendant entities (18%) 
received multipliers of 1.0. DOJ acknowledged in the FCA Guidance that a 
resolution with a multiplier of 1.0 does not even make DOJ whole or leave the 
defendant without the benefit of the wrongdoing.101 The FCA Guidance notes that 
even where defendants are receiving benefits for compliant behaviors, the benefits 
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cannot be so much as to prevent the government from recovering a multiplier 
sufficiently above 1.0 to cover the lost interest, cost of investigation, and relator’s 
share (in the case of a qui tam).  
Several of the DOJ press releases accompanying those sixteen 1.0 multiplier 
resolutions included government statements about defendants engaged in 
wrongdoing being “held accountable,”102 that the resolution sent a “message [that] 
. . . [f]raudulently billing for services is bad business,”103 or other, similar language. 
Virtually all involved conduct from several years prior, and therefore a multiplier 
substantially above 1.0 would have been required simply to cover interest. These 
defendants’ resolutions effectively require them to repay what amounts to a no-
interest loan to the government, in at least one case, having kept some or all of the 
ill-gotten gains for more than a decade.104 And in terms of the government receiving 
“full compensation” as called for under the FCA Guidance,105 in addition to failing 
to recover lost interest or costs of investigation, nine of the sixteen were the result 
of qui tams, meaning the government paid at least 15% of those recoveries to a 
relator.106  
 
                                                   
102 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Pentec Health, Inc. to Pay $17 Million to Settle 
False Claims Act Allegations (Feb. 4, 2019), in JUST. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/pentec-health-inc-pay-17-million-settle-false-claims-
act-allegations [https://perma.cc/N5A5-5XEA]; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Signature HealthCARE to Pay More than $30 Million to Resolve False Claims Act 
Allegations Related to Rehabilitation Therapy (June 8, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/signature-healthcare-pay-more-30-million-resolve-false-
claims-act-allegations-related [https://perma.cc/83RT-VVH4] (“When we determine that 
companies are cheating the taxpayers, we will hold them accountable as we have in this 
case.”). 
103 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Ambulance Company to Pay $9 Million to Settle 
False Claims Act Allegations (Mar. 28, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ambulance-company-pay-9-million-settle-false-claims-act-
allegations [https://perma.cc/AV5G-84QL]. 
104 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Pentec Health, Inc. to Pay $17 Million, supra note 102 
(describing the time period of the misconduct as “2007 to 2018”). 
105 See FCA Guidance, supra note 74. 
106 While some of these 16 cases may have had limited recoveries due to defendants’ 
ability to pay, DOJ declined in these cases to require judgments and contingency payments 
over time to raise the multiplier in order to achieve even the possibility of the government 
being made whole and the defendants fully disgorging their benefits from the misconduct. 
See FCA Guidance, supra note 74. 
CSAs contain identifying language when a defendants’ lack of financial resources have 
impacted the resolution. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 2488 
(2020), However, such language does not identify whether the impact took the form of a 
reduced multiplier, or instead took other forms, including allowing payments over time. 
Given DOJ’s ability to use additional tools—payments over time, judgments, contingency 
payments—to achieve whatever multiplier is deemed appropriate, ability to pay cannot be a 
plausible or satisfying explanation for the low multipliers found in numerous CSAs.  
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D.  Significant Impact Based on Involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch 
 
I also examined the government entity handling the resolution. Of the civil-only 
resolutions I identified, seventy-four (63%) were handled by individual U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch in 
Washington. In comparison, forty-four (37%) involved the Commercial Litigation 
Branch in addition to a U.S. Attorney’s Office. I then ran a two-sample t-test to 
analyze the difference in means for the fifty-three (60%) resolutions handled by 
individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the involvement of the Commercial 
Litigation Branch for which I could identify the multiplier and the thirty-six (40%) 
resolutions which involved the Commercial Litigation Branch in addition to a U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for which I could identify the multiplier. 
The mean multiplier for cases without the involvement of the Commercial 
Litigation Branch (M = 1.86, SD = 0.429) was significantly higher (at 5% level) than 
the mean multiplier for cases with the involvement of the Commercial Litigation 
Branch (M = 1.66, SD = 0.458), t(87) = 2.107, p = 0.037.107 
In considering possible explanations for this significant difference in means, I 
examined whether the size of the resolutions might explain it. As noted above, DOJ’s 
Civil Division must approve all large settlements unless the case is delegated to an 
individual U.S. Attorney’s Office to handle.108 As a result, the mean resolution for 
cases without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch was 
$7,404,954, while the mean resolution for cases involving the Commercial 
Litigation Branch in addition to a U.S. Attorney’s Office was $34,857,974. Given 
this, I calculated the correlation between the multiplier and the amount of the 
restitution and found the correlation coefficient to be 0.0347—a very weak uphill 
(positive) linear relationship. The difference in resolution size thus does not explain 
the difference in means. 
  
                                                   
107 See infra Appendix 2. 
108 See DOJ CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 63.  
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Of the eleven CSAs above 2.0, referenced in Section III.B., above, the 
Commercial Litigation Branch participated in only one of them—the rest were 
handled by individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the participation of the 
Commercial Litigation Branch. Interestingly, five of the eleven were from one U.S. 
Attorney’s Office (which also had three CSAs at 2.0 and one CSA below 2.0 when 
resolving cases without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch, and 
one CSA at 2.0 resolved with the involvement of the Commercial Litigation 
Branch). Given the small sample size relating to each U.S. Attorney’s Office and the 
lack of case-specific information, it is fair to ask but impossible to conclude 
definitively that there is a lack of consistency among individual U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices in determining FCA multipliers. Without greater transparency, however, 
such outliers will inevitably lead to speculation that certain prosecuting offices are 
requiring higher multipliers than others. 
There is reason, both in terms of structure and of incentives, to be concerned 
that different U.S. Attorney’s Offices may have different views as to how resolutions 
should be calculated. Structurally, there is simply no DOJ guidance—neither public 
nor internal—to guide U.S. Attorney’s Offices in calculating FCA multipliers. DOJ 
officials have made statements trumpeting the potential exposure for defendants 
under the statute. Still, they have provided no guidance to the field as to how they 
should determine numbers below the maximum. 
This is particularly important because the 118 cases involved forty-six different 
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fifty-three cases without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch. And 
while inconsistency is of concern even were it limited to smaller resolutions, it is 
notable that many of the U.S. Attorney’s Office-only resolutions were larger than 
might be expected given the delegation rules.109 The mean U.S. Attorney’s Office-
only resolution was $7.4 million, and there were seven U.S. Attorney’s Office-only 
resolutions above $10 million. 
Various potential explanations exist for this aspect of the data analysis. One 
possibility, explained and examined in further detail in Section III.E., below, is that 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices might be treating defendants more harshly because of a 
desire to improve their standing with the qui tam bar as they compete with other U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices for future cases. (Such efforts would not necessarily be limited 
to the handling of qui tam cases.110) The difference might also be explained by the 
fact that the Commercial Litigation Branch simply has a different view than some 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices as to the appropriate method of multiplier calculation, or by 
the fact that the Commercial Litigation Branch handles many more cases, leading 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices to lack context and potentially view the conduct of their 
defendants more harshly.111 As available data continues to grow, further analysis 
may provide answers to these questions. 
 
E.  Questionable Impact Based on Existence of Qui Tams—Data Bears Watching 
 
The structure of the qui tam system incentivizes individual U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices to compete for the attention of relators’ counsel, who are frequently repeat 
players, largely control the distribution of cases among U.S. Attorney’s Offices by 
deciding where to file their cases, and file their cases where the resolution is likely 
to be highest (as relators’ share is a percentage of the government’s recovery).112 As 
                                                   
109 Id.  
110 Members of the qui tam bar likely do not look only to resolutions stemming from qui 
tams when evaluating which U.S. Attorney’s Offices generate the largest settlements. Cases 
generated from qui tams may take on increased significance, however, because of statements 
made by the involved qui tam attorneys about whether the government maximized the 
potential recovery. A substantial number of qui tam attorneys are members of Taxpayers 
Against Fraud Education Fund, and participate in a listserv where they share information 
regarding, among other things, their experiences with individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices. 
Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund Membership, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. 
FUND, https:///member.taf.org/become-a-member [https://perma.cc/2SA3-K24S] (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2020).  
111 See Adi Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1205 (2017) 
(analyzing judicial decision making as to sentencing and arguing that judges sentence given 
offenses “more harshly when their caseloads contain relatively milder offenses and more 
leniently when their caseloads contain more serious crimes.”). 
112 See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence 
from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (2012) (analyzing qui tam filings 
and noting superior litigation outcomes in the large number of qui tams filed by repeat 
players); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
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a result, there is reason to be concerned that the qui tam system is impacting the 
behavior of U.S. Attorney’s Offices in resolving FCA matters. The system may 
create pressure for individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices to be tougher on defendants 
to impress potential relators’ counsel. Individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices may be 
susceptible to pressure from relators’ counsel in individual cases to use a higher 
multiplier (whether by taking a higher position as to the baseline multiplier or by 
providing less of a compliant behavior benefit). 
I examined cases originating from a qui tam and those cases which did not 
involve a qui tam. There were seventy-seven (65%) cases involving a qui tam and 
forty-one (35%) cases without a qui tam.113 I ran a two-sample t-test to analyze the 
difference in means for the fifty-five (62%) of resolutions involving a qui tam for 
which I could identify the multiplier and the thirty-four (38%) of resolutions not 
involving a qui tam for which I could identify the multiplier. 
The mean multiplier for cases involving qui tams (M = 1.82, SD = 0.453) was 
higher, but not significantly so, than the mean multiplier for cases which did not 
involve qui tams (M = 1.72, SD = 0.442), t(87) = 1.066, p = 0.291. 
The incentives referenced above do not apply to the Commercial Litigation 
Branch, as the Commercial Litigation Branch does not have to be concerned about 
the distribution of cases among U.S. Attorney’s Offices. All cases are filed with the 
U.S. Attorney General, and the Commercial Litigation Branch can always elect to 
participate in a filed case. As such, I also separately ran a two-sample t-test to 
analyze the difference in means for the thirty-one (58%) cases involving a qui tam 
and twenty-two (42%) cases without a qui tam among the cases handled by 
individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the involvement of the Commercial 
Litigation Branch, and for the twenty-four (67%) cases involving a qui tam and 
twelve (33%) cases without a qui tam among the cases handled with the involvement 
of the Commercial Litigation Branch. 
Among the cases handled with the involvement of the Commercial Litigation 
Branch, there was virtually no difference in multipliers (1.66 vs. 1.68) between the 
qui tam and non-qui tam groups. Among the cases led by individual U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch, however, 
there was a greater difference in multipliers (1.95 vs. 1.74) between the qui tam and 
non-qui tam groups. With the small sample size, the difference was statistically 
significant at 10% level but not at 5% level. 
Among cases handled by individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the 
involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch, the mean multiplier for cases 
involving qui tams (M = 1.95, SD = 0.394) was higher (significantly so at 10% level) 
than the mean multiplier for cases which did not involve qui tams (M = 1.74, SD = 
0.453), t(51) = 1.831, p = 0.069.114 
                                                   
113 Qui tams account for roughly two-thirds of resolutions, despite DOJ’s increased use 
of and investment in data analytics and other sources of case generation. Qui tams accounted 
for more than two-thirds of money ($2.1 billion out of $3 billion) recovered by DOJ through 
FCA cases in Fiscal Year 2019. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers 2019, 
supra note 39. 
114 A table summarizing this data is included at Appendix 3. 
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This data is suggestive, but it is debatable whether the qui tam system is 
impacting the behavior of individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices in resolving FCA 
matters, and this bears watching as new data becomes available and the sample size 
grows. 
 
F.  Can We Infer How DOJ Actually Treats Compliant Behaviors and Acceptance 
of Responsibility? 
 
While I attempted to track references in DOJ’s and defendants’ public 
comments to compliant behaviors and acceptance of responsibility, the resolutions 
were insufficiently transparent as to these factors for statistical analysis to be 
appropriate. Unlike in criminal cases, where plea agreements contain the 
calculations under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which make clear whether there 
was self-disclosure, cooperation, a sufficient pre-existing compliance program, and 
acceptance of responsibility, no such calculations are contained within CSAs. As 
such, my tracking of references to compliant behaviors and acceptance of 
responsibility are useful solely for purposes of anecdotal analysis.  
This anecdotal analysis does have significant limitations due to the lack of DOJ 
transparency. It is not possible to know whether unknown factors explain some or 
all of what appear based on known factors to be unjustified results.115 And where the 
anecdotal evidence comes in the form of public statements from settling defendants 
touting their compliant behavior rather than from DOJ, it is not possible to know 
whether DOJ disagreed with their claims.116 Even with those limitations noted, the 
anecdotal evidence suggests, at best, inconsistent application of benefits for 
compliant behaviors.  
There were some examples of defendants engaging in compliant behaviors and 
receiving below mean multiplier resolutions. Two defendants received multipliers 
of 1.0, and two other defendants received multipliers of 1.5 as part of resolutions 
where DOJ noted in press releases that the defendants had self-disclosed the 
misconduct or engaged in other compliant behaviors.117 
                                                   
115 This, of course, is the reason why DOJ’s criminal resolutions have included detailed 
calculations, as described supra Section I.C. With such calculations visible, defendants—
and the public—can see the impact of standard factors and are left with a narrower range 
within which unenumerated factors may have played a role. 
116 While statistical analysis would likely address on a global level any gaming of the 
percentage of total settlements allocated to actual damages in order to maximize a 
defendant’s tax deduction, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-18.300, it is 
possible such behavior could limit the descriptive value of an individual resolution. Gaming 
is unlikely to explain the anecdotes described below, however, as it would presumably result 
in lowering the multiplier for defendants who have cooperated with the government’s 
investigation, while the anecdotes below, notably, do not reflect such a downward 
adjustment. 
117 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., VCU Health System Authority Agrees to $4 
Million Settlement (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/vcu-health-
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Even some of those resolutions, however, make it clear that DOJ lacks a policy 
for calculating multipliers based on the facts of a specific case. In one of those 
resolutions, the U.S. Attorney noted that the 1.5 multiplier was given because of the 
defendant’s self-disclosure and remedial measures and that otherwise, “the False 
Claims Act typically imposes liability for 3 times the amount of loss suffered by the 
government”—a statement at odds with my analysis finding no multipliers above 
2.75, and only eleven above 2.0.118 Similarly, in May 2019, the Principal Deputy 
Associate Attorney General trumpeted a March 2019 resolution in which a 
defendant was given what she referred to as a “discounted damages multiple of 1.7” 
as evidence that companies can benefit from cooperation.119 It seems unlikely DOJ 
would have highlighted that “discount” if they understood it to have been a reduction 
of only 0.08 below the mean multiplier as a “credit” for “shar[ing] the results of its 
extensive internal investigation and also help[ing] the government assess its losses 
by developing a damages model.” 120  
At the same time, there were at least as many instances of defendants receiving 
above-mean 2.0 multipliers despite clear evidence of substantial cooperation, 
including references to the defendant’s cooperation in some of the CSAs and DOJ 
press releases. 
As one clear example, a DOJ press release from February 2019 noted a 
defendant “discovered non-compliance problems internally. To their credit, they 
took corrective action, and they came forward to voluntarily disclose to the 
Government what had occurred.”121 But while the U.S. Attorney announcing the 
resolution went so far as to say that “[the defendant’s] proactive approach in [the] 
case sets a good example for other providers who might find themselves facing 
similar issues,” DOJ required the entity to pay a 2.0 multiplier—higher than the 
mean multiplier of 1.78.122 
                                                   
system-authority-agrees-4-million-settlement [https://perma.cc/CU78-45PD]; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Ambulance Provider and Hospital Agree to Pay $1,425,000 to 
Settle Ambulance Transportation Claims (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
me/pr/ambulance-provider-and-hospital-agree-pay-1425000-settle-ambulance-transportat 
ion-claims [https://perma.cc/FF2Z-RTFT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Otsego Home 
Health Care Company to Pay More than $700,000 to Resolve False Claims Act Liability 
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/otsego-home-health-care-company-
pay-more-700000-resolve-false-claims-act-liability [https://perma.cc/P684-DUUH]; U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., Medical Equipment Company, supra note 54; see also infra Appendix 1. 
118 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Medical Equipment Company, supra note 54.  
119 McCusker Murray, supra note 78. 
120 Id.  
121 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Dynamic Therapy Services, LLC and 
PhysioHealth, Inc. to Pay $2 Million to Resolve Allegations of Improperly Billing TRICARE 
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In another example, a DOJ press release from May 2018 noted the defendant 
“cooperated fully with [the] investigation,” while the resolution required the entity 
again to pay a 2.0 multiplier.123 In another, a Civil Settlement Agreement stated the 
defendant “cooperated with the government throughout its investigation,” with the 
resolution again requiring the entity to pay a 2.0 multiplier.124 In another, a DOJ 
press release from February 2019 stated the defendant “replaced the majority of its 
executive team [which would constitute a substantial remedial measure], conducted 
an internal investigation, and voluntarily disclosed significant amounts of 
information . . .” while the resolution required the entity to pay a 1.89 multiplier—
again higher than the mean multiplier of 1.78.125 Similarly, a DOJ press release 
announcing a resolution with a 1.79 multiplier praised the defendant company, 
stating “When violations are discovered, corporations should seek to immediately 
cooperate and resolve the allegations and minimize future risks, as [the defendant] 
has done here.”126 
In numerous other cases, defendants who received above-mean multipliers 
claimed in press releases or in statements to media that they had cooperated with the 
government’s investigation, instituted remedial measures, or otherwise engaged in 
compliant behaviors.127 In one of those cases, the company receiving a 2.0 multiplier 
                                                   
123 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $6.6 Million 
Settlement Against CityMD for Submitting False Claims to Medicare (May 4, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-66-million-settle 
ment-against-citymd-submitting-false [https://perma.cc/5RSV-35F3]; Stipulation and Order 
of Settlement and Dismissal at 4, United States ex rel. Bevilacqua v. City Practice Group of 
New York, LLC, et al., No. 14 Civ. 9933 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1060246/download [https://perma.cc 
/Q75R-FZAW]. 
124 Federal Settlement Agreement at 4, United States ex rel. Cretaro-Williams v. 
Dermatology Associates of Central New York, PLCC, et al., No. 15-cv-00315-TJM-ATB, 
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/press-release/file/1117066/ 
download [https://perma.cc/7KSW-SRXT]. 
125 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Union General Hospital to Pay $5 Million to 
Resolve Alleged False Claims Act Violations (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
ndga/pr/union-general-hospital-pay-5-million-resolve-alleged-false-claims-act-violations 
[https://perma.cc/Q5GE-V4CB]; see infra Appendixes 1–3. 
126 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Skilled Nursing Facility Management Company 
Agrees to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Feb. 5, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/usao-
mdtn/pr/skilled-nursing-facility-management-company-agrees-settle-false-claims-act-alleg 
ations [https://perma.cc/3GQ6-B9M9]; see infra Appendixes 1–3. 
127 See, e.g., Aaron Leibowitz, Target to Pay $3M Over Unauthorized Pill Refills in 
Mass., LAW360 (Dec. 11, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1110201 
[https://perma.cc/ZLH8-9WVK]; Madisson Haynes, HyperHeal to Pay over $400,000 for 
Unnecessary Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy, WUSA9 (May 31, 2019, 8:56 PM), 
https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/maryland/hyperheal-to-pay-over-400000-for-
unnecessary-hyperbaric-oxygen-therapy/65-80c51bba-604e-4a2a-bc24-2454dfc1bf32 
[https://perma.cc/ME2F-54GQ]; Genesis Must Pay $1.88 Million to Settle Medicare Over-
Payment Allegations, WQAD8 (Mar. 27, 2018, 8:28 PM), https://wqad.com/2018/03/27/ 
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stated that the wrongdoing “was brought to our attention, fully investigated and 
voluntarily reported to government authorities. . . . We have been fully cooperative 
with the government in the resolution of this matter, and have taken appropriate 
measures to correct these issues moving forward.”128 
This information appears at odds with DOJ’s public position on the effects of 
defendants’ cooperation on the settlement terms in FCA cases. Although the sample 
size is small, the results of my analysis are suggestive. At least without further 
information, it is difficult to square these results with the message of the FCA 
Guidance. 
At the same time, several defendants received multipliers below 2.0 despite 
clear evidence that they did not even accept responsibility—never mind provide 
cooperation—regarding the alleged wrongdoing, and where there was no visible 
evidence of compliant behavior. Several of the defendants who received multipliers 
of 1.0—solely paying restitution without any additional payment to even cover the 
lost interest, cost of investigation, or relator’s share, all of which must be taken into 
account under the FCA Guidance—affirmatively denied they had violated the False 
Claims Act.129 
                                                   
genesis-must-pay-1-88-million-to-settle-claims-that-it-overbilled-patients/ [https://perma. 
cc/3CYU-J752]; Rehab Center, Founders Agree to $1.3M Settlement in False Claims Case, 
NEW HAVEN REG. (Apr. 27, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Reh 
ab-center-founders-agree-to-1-3M-settlement-12869106.php [https://perma.cc/3WXL-
FVUV]; John Commins, Michigan Hospital to Pay $84.5M to Settle Stark Law, Kickback 
Claims, HEALTHLEADERS (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/clinical-
care/michigan-hospital-pay-845m-settle-stark-law-kickback-claims [https://perma.cc/V6PT 
-3RGL]; News Release, Beaumont, Beaumont Health Resolves Longstanding Investigation, 
Looks to Future (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.beaumont.org/health-wellness/press-
releases/beaumont-health-resolves-longstanding-investigation-looks-to-future [https://per 
ma.cc/6DPF-AZZV]; Press Release, Medtronic, Medtronic Statement Regarding Recent 
DOJ Announcement (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.medtronic.com/us-en/about/news/media-
resources/medtronic-statement-regarding-doj.html; [https://perma.cc/5CNU-W6UD]; 
Susannah Luthi, MedStar Pays $35 Million in False Claims Act Settlement, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:59 PM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/law-
regulation/medstar-pays-35-million-false-claims-act-settlement [https://perma.cc/764R-
BN9B]; John Commins, CareWell Urgent Care to Pay $2M to Resolve Upcoding 
Allegations, HEALTHLEADERS (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/care 
well-urgent-care-pay-2m-resolve-upcoding-allegations [https://perma.cc/4N2E-7BQ9]; see 
infra Appendixes 1–3. 
128 Amye Anderson, Livingston Hospital Agrees to Settle False Claims Act Allegations, 
UPPER CUMBERLAND BUS. J. (June 21, 2018), https://www.ucbjournal.com/livingston-
hospital-agrees-to-settle-false-claims-act-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/SN67-W546]. 
129 See, e.g., Ayla Ellison, Specialty Pharmacy Pays $17M to Settle Medicare Billing 
Fraud Suit, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com 
/legal-regulatory-issues/specialty-pharmacy-pays-17m-to-settle-medicare-billing-fraud-law 
suit.html [https://perma.cc/D5QX-RUQV]; Marty Stempniak, Vanguard Healthcare Will 
Pay $18M to Settle False Claims Act Allegations, MCKNIGHT’S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS 
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.mcknights.com/news/vanguard-healthcare-will-pay-18m-to-
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That is not necessarily to say the first group did not receive adequate credit for 
their cooperation—it is theoretically possible those multipliers would have been 
above 2.0 if not for their cooperation—or that there were no other reasons for the 
second group to receive below 2.0 multipliers. Due to the lack of DOJ transparency, 
it is not possible to know whether DOJ disagreed with these defendants’ claims of 
engaging in compliant behaviors. 
As discussed below, the lack of transparency is no less a problem than the 
apparent lack of consistency. If these resolutions do reflect a consistent rationale for 
determining multipliers in individual cases, including true cooperation or acceptance 
of responsibility benefit, the lack of transparency necessarily means they fail to 
adequately inform industry and the defense bar of the existence and extent of those 
benefits. 
It was also notable that while there were some examples where DOJ noted a 
company’s self-disclosure or cooperation, I did not find a single instance of DOJ 
even claiming to credit a company’s pre-existing compliance program in 
determining the appropriate resolution of an FCA case. If this is reflective of DOJ 
not properly valuing the existence of a compliance program (and its lack of 
meaningful inclusion in the FCA Guidance was not inadvertent), that would be 
troubling, as it is the one compliant behavior aimed directly at stopping fraud before 
it occurs. 
 
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Comparison of the criminal and civil schemes for resolving cases, particularly 
in conjunction with data analysis and anecdotal evidence, raises several issues and 
suggests there are structural problems with DOJ’s handling of FCA resolutions. 
Notable amongst those issues are: DOJ’s failure to utilize the top end of FCA 
exposure; over-incentivizing settlement and under-incentivizing acceptance of 
responsibility; and the lack of sufficiently detailed guidance and transparency to 
create appropriate uniformity across DOJ components and appropriately incentivize 
industry.  
  
                                                   
settle-false-claims-act-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/AHE3-GA7Z]; Chris Marr, Florida 




U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.112, (“The maximum credit that a 
defendant may earn may not exceed an amount that would result in the government receiving 
less than full compensation for the losses caused by the defendant’s misconduct (including 
the government’s damages, lost interest, costs of investigation, and relator share.”). 
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A.  DOJ’s Failure to Utilize the Top End of FCA Exposure & Adequately Deter 
Corporate Health Care Fraud 
 
The data calls into question whether DOJ is applying multipliers in a manner 
that maximizes deterrence and incentivizes compliant behavior. While treble 
damages plus penalties are available under the statute, the data makes clear that no 
one—neither the Commercial Litigation Branch nor any individual U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices—is requiring even close to treble damages, never mind penalties, when 
resolving FCA cases through settlement. 
DOJ made no use of the top end of potential FCA exposure in cases between 
early 2018 and June 2019—not only did none of the eighty-nine resolutions involve 
the imposition of penalties, but none had a multiplier higher than 2.75, only three 
were above 2.5, and only eleven above 2.0. For all of DOJ’s statements about the 
power of the FCA to recover government money and deter fraud, the data calls into 
question whether, in many cases, DOJ’s FCA resolutions accomplish either goal 
given the substantial incentives apparently being offered to defendants for settling 
their cases. 
Commentators have debated the appropriate FCA multiplier for achieving 
general deterrence, but none have suggested a multiplier as low as seen in the data 
would achieve DOJ’s deterrence objectives.130 The debate has generally centered 
around whether the goal should be complete or optimal deterrence. Optimal 
deterrence is defined as calculating a penalty to compel a wrongdoer to fully 
internalize a victim’s loss, including taking into account the likelihood that the 
wrongdoer might not have been discovered and that the victim might not take action 
because of the costs of investigation and prosecution, among other things.131 
Complete deterrence is defined as calculating a penalty to equal or exceed any 
potential gain to the wrongdoer from the wrongful conduct, taking into account the 
likelihood that the wrongdoer might not have been caught and held liable for the 
conduct.132 
Some commentators have focused on the broader question of whether civil 
sanctions should be viewed as tools to compensate injuries and to “price” 
misconduct, rather than “prohibit” violations.133 DOJ has regularly rejected the idea 
that health care fraud settlements are solely a “cost of doing business.”134 In the FCA 
                                                   
130 See, e.g., Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 279–80. 
131 See id. at 266. 
132 Id. at 268. 
133 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1538–51 
(1984); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law 
Models – And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876–77 (1992). 
134 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Respironics to Pay $34.8 Million for 
Allegedly Causing False Claims to Medicare, Medicaid and Tricare Related to the Sale of 
Masks Designed to Treat Sleep Apnea (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/resp 
ironics-pay-348-million-allegedly-causing-false-claims-medicare-medicaid-and-tricare 
[https://perma.cc/S3LZ-BGU6] (“We hope that those who commit fraud will recognize that 
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context, DOJ has claimed to utilize civil sanctions in a manner not meaningfully 
distinguishable from criminal sanctions—using consequences not only to take away 
any financial reward for engaging in health care fraud but to prevent the conduct 
completely.135 
Timothy Jost and Sharon Davies examined this debate at length, concluding 
that “[b]ecause the level of auditing and enforcement in federal health care programs 
is very low, deterrence theory would seem to dictate that penalties imposed on 
providers who are found liable for fraud and abuse must be set very high before even 
optimal deterrence is achieved.”136 As a result, Jost and Davies took the position that 
in some cases, even treble damages and penalties are likely “too mild rather than too 
severe” and that “[t]o settle false claims cases routinely for significantly less ‘than 
the legally authorized penalties’ is to undermine even optimal deterrence and to risk 
encouraging improper billing.”137 
As noted above,138 a large number of FCA settlements recovered no more—and 
often less—than the amount of damages plus interest. No complex analysis of 
economic incentives is necessary to conclude that such settlements do exactly what 
Jost and Davies warned against.139 
Even putting deterrence aside, the gap between potential treble damages and 
penalties on the high end and single damages on the low end provides DOJ with an 
opportunity to offer meaningful rewards for compliant behaviors, and presumably 
to also take into account other factors laid out in both the FCA Guidance and the 
Corporate Prosecution Guidelines (e.g. “the nature and seriousness of the violation, 
the scope of the violation . . . the defendant’s history of recidivism, the harm or risk 
of harm from the violation . . . .”).140 But DOJ has, in practice, greatly narrowed that 
gap and limited its ability to meaningfully reward compliant behaviors among 
settling defendants. 
 
                                                   
it is our goal to make the consequences more than just the cost of doing business.” (quotation 
omitted)); Fighting Fraud and Waste in Medicare and Medicaid: Spec. Hearing Before a 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 35 (2011) (testimony of Tony West, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Civ. Div., Dep’t of Just.) (arguing that “[i]t cannot be that a company 
sees healthcare enforcement, law enforcement, imposing a fine as a cost of doing business.”). 
135 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers 2018, supra note 41. See also 
Coffee, supra note 133, at 1876–77. 
136 Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 279. 
137 Id. at 280, 308. 
138 See supra Section III.C. 
139 See Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 308. While it is true that the settlement figure is 
not the only cost to defendants, and collateral costs may be substantial—costs of 
investigation, defense, remediation, and in some cases a Corporate Integrity Agreement 
(“CIA”) with HHS-OIG—those costs (other than a CIA) are likely to apply regardless of 
whether the investigation discovers wrongdoing, thus eliminating its deterrent value, and 
there is no evidence in the data that DOJ used the existence of any such costs as a rationale 
for reducing the required multiplier. 
140 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 53, § 4-4.120; Corporate 
Prosecution Principles, supra note 4.  
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B.  Under-Incentivizing Compliant Behaviors & Over-Incentivizing Settlement 
 
Given that DOJ does seek treble damages and penalties in the rare case when 
an FCA case goes to trial or is resolved on summary judgment, the results represent 
an enormous benefit for the simple act of settling. DOJ has provided a far greater 
benefit to defendants for resolving cases in the FCA context—even with defendants 
who rarely accept responsibility, and in many cases, affirmatively deny 
responsibility—than in the criminal context, where the act of pleading guilty brings 
with it an actual acceptance of responsibility.  
Even if there is a benefit for compliant behaviors and acceptance of 
responsibility, they are dwarfed by the credit given for the simple act of settling. 
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the reduction for a defendant organization’s 
self-disclosure is five times the reduction for mere acceptance of responsibility, and 
the reductions for cooperation or for having had an effective compliance and ethics 
program in place are two times and three times the acceptance of responsibility 
deduction, respectively. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines multiplier reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility is only 0.2-0.4—smaller than adjustments based on the 
size of the organization, and the role in the organization of the responsible 
individuals.141 In the FCA context, where penalties are regularly more than the 
amount of the damages for each claim, it can conservatively be said that the 
government’s forgoing of penalties and reduction of the FCA multiplier at or below 
2.0 is a reduction of 2.0—five to ten times the reduction given in criminal cases. 
Over-incentivizing settlement carries with it two powerful risks—the risk of 
under-deterrence in cases of true wrongdoing (addressed above with regard to DOJ’s 
failure to utilize the top end of FCA exposure), and the risk of coerced settlements 
where defendants have not engaged in wrongdoing. While Jost and Davies’s analysis 
of optimal deterrence theory and the FCA concluded that the latter was a more 
substantial problem, they noted the former was a primary grievance of industry.142 
For decades, industry and defense counsel have complained that the magnitude of 
FCA exposure creates an environment where defendants are vulnerable to “unfair 
and abusive” settlements.143 Jost and Davies listed “coerced settlements” as one of 
the top “grievances” of FCA defendants, noting industry claims of “extortionate 
settlements.”144 Joan Krause took issue with Jost and Davies’ dismissal of such 
concerns, arguing that Jost and Davies failed to account for cases where defendants 
lack the requisite intent for liability under the FCA but might be deterred from 
challenging the government’s claims given the risk of an FCA judgment of trebles 
and penalties.145 Krause expressed concern that the FCA structure was potentially 
                                                   
141 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.8 (2018). 
142 Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 258, 310–11.  
143 Id. at 258. 
144 Id. at 264–65. 
145 Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of 
Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 207–08 (2001). 
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leading to coerced settlements—a concern that would surely be heightened by the 
newly revealed data. 
Until now, the debate surrounding potentially coercive FCA resolutions and the 
appropriate settlement discount has taken place essentially in the dark, with no 
visibility as to how DOJ has resolved cases.146 While the data provides even more 
reason for concern in this area—both for Jost and Davies’s concern regarding under-
deterrence and Krause’s concern regarding coerced settlements—it also enables for 
the first time a conversation about the appropriate calculations grounded in reality 
rather than an abstraction. 
Transparency will also allow for a public discussion of the appropriate standard 
multiplier to achieve deterrence, the magnitude of compliant behavior credit and the 
settling benefit, and whether, as some in industry and the defense bar have argued, 
it is so large as to force defendants to settle even if they strongly feel they did not 
engage in wrongdoing.147  
If a settling benefit of this magnitude is truly DOJ’s intention, transparency will 
benefit DOJ by setting clear expectations for defendants. It would also do much to 
counter skepticism amongst industry and the defense bar that meaningful credit for 
compliant behaviors is actually given. As is described above, there are many 
                                                   
146 Jost and Davies speculated that at least some U.S. Attorneys had settled FCA cases 
for far less than treble damages plus penalties, but were limited to only a few anecdotes. “A 
report of another recent settlement quoted a U.S. Attorney as stating that the case was settled 
by applying a multiplier of 2.1 to 2.5 times actual damages to reach the settlement, suggesting 
that at least some U.S. Attorneys have devised approaches to settling FCA cases for amounts 
far below the penalties legally available under the FCA.” Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 
306 n.353 (referencing Fraud and Abuse: Baltimore Hospital to Pay $827,000 to Settle 
Medicare Fraud Allegations, HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (BNA) (June 15, 1998) at d7, 
available in WL 6/15/98 HCD d7).  
147 See Krause, supra note 145, at 204 (citing Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn 
Anyone into a Crook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2000, at A18); Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare 
Medical Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of Discretion and Abuse of Process in 
the War Against Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 114 (1999) (arguing 
that FCA’s “threat of draconian . . . sanctions coerces providers into settlements regarding 
issues on which providers would likely prevail”); John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why 
Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1999) (arguing penalty structure “places great pressure on defendants to 
settle even meritless suits”); Thomas S. Crane, Health Care, Defense Industry Must Regroup 
Efforts to Reform False Claims Act, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 1, 2 (Apr. 21, 1999) 
(arguing FCA penalties are among “the most abused tools in the government’s arsenal to 
leverage exorbitant settlements”); William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 282 JAMA 
1179, 1180 (1999) (noting “large organizations have such a large stake in avoiding exclusion 
from Medicare that they readily settle pending charges, making much of fraud control 
resemble a rebate program more than a law enforcement exercise.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7 (discussing the potential for HHS-OIG exclusion, which, in addition the the FCA 
damages consequences, puts enormous pressure on defendant companies to resolve cases 
amicably).  
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anecdotal examples of defendant companies who received above-mean multipliers 
despite having claimed in statements to the media or press releases that they had 
cooperated with the government’s investigation, instituted remedial measures, or 
otherwise engaged in compliant behaviors.148 With the lack of a calculation structure 
forcing industry and the defense bar to look to each resolution announcement to 
understand DOJ’s analysis, such examples fit neatly with the narrative of some that 
DOJ does not provide the benefits it claims.149 But it may be the case that DOJ 
disagrees that those entities provided cooperation in the investigation or otherwise 
engaged in compliant behaviors, or that other factors pushed those multipliers higher 
despite compliant behavior reductions. Transparency as to calculations would 
eliminate that basis for skepticism. 
 
C.  Under-Incentivizing Acceptance of Responsibility 
 
To the extent FCA settlements are viewed as the result of prosecutorial coercion 
(rather than wrongdoing) or as nothing more than the cost of doing business for 
health care entities, DOJ’s credibility and perceived legitimacy are put at risk. 
As Joan Krause has written, “[t]he industry’s distrust of FCA enforcement has 
important implications for the future of the health care anti-fraud agenda.”150 Krause 
focused on the question of whether DOJ was using the FCA to obtain settlements in 
cases where the conduct was not worthy of DOJ enforcement and noted the risk that 
industry would view DOJ enforcement under the FCA as inconsistently applied, 
potentially interfering with effective crime control.151 Krause pointed to theorists 
regarding the importance of “perceived legitimacy and moral credibility of the law” 
and argued: 
 
[I]f health care providers come to believe that the law is being applied 
unfairly—that federal prosecutors are pursuing inappropriate cases, 
                                                   
148 See sources cited supra note 127. These more than half dozen examples of defendant 
companies received above-mean multipliers despite having claimed in statements to the 
media or in press releases that they had cooperated with the government’s investigation, 
instituted remedial measures, or otherwise engaged in compliant behaviors. 
149 See, e.g., Rebecca Martin & Sarah Walters, Updated Yates Memo Still Has Force in 
Civil Domain, LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2018, 11:20 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1111 
279/updated-yates-memo-still-has-force-in-civil-domain [https://perma.cc/9JJ7-PD6U]. 
This article by McDermott, Will & Emery attorneys, one of whom previously worked for 
DOJ, notes that there is an “enduring mystery about what ‘credit’ actually means in a 
practical, dollars-and-cents way” and that “the Yates Memo left practitioners scratching their 
heads regarding how the government actually quantifies ‘cooperation credit’ in FCA 
matters,” moving forward. Id.  
150 Krause, supra note 145, at 127. 
151 Id. at 207–08 (“[L]egitimate providers whose activities fall within a regulatory gray 
area might well be more likely to fear the untoward effects of a fraud suit, and hence more 
likely to settle.”). 
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hoping defendants will settle rather than take their chances at trial—the 
legitimacy of the government’s anti-fraud efforts may be questioned. 
Doubt as to the legitimacy of the government’s efforts would likely lead 
to further industry non-compliance . . . .152 
 
While Krause focused on her concern regarding “potentially staggering civil 
liability under the FCA”153 and potential over-prosecution by DOJ—analysis of the 
now-available data raises an additional reason for worry regarding perception of 
legitimacy—DOJ has substantially rewarded settlement while being seemingly 
indifferent to actual acceptance of responsibility. With few exceptions, the FCA 
settlements examined did not include any admissions from the defendants and 
included language in the CSAs that “[t]o avoid the delay, uncertainty, 
inconvenience, and expense of protracted litigation of the above claims, and in 
consideration of the mutual promises and obligations of this Settlement Agreement, 
the Parties agree and covenant . . . .”154 Consistent with the CSAs, virtually all of the 
DOJ press releases announcing the FCA settlements included language to the effect 
that “[t]he [civil] claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only, and there 
has been no determination of liability.”155  
DOJ’s policy of allowing companies to obtain the substantial settlement benefit 
in FCA cases while actively denying wrongdoing is, on its face, even more 
problematic than the much-maligned “neither admit nor deny” language, which is 
common in Securities and Exchange Commission resolutions. The SEC adopted the 
no-admit/no-deny policy itself out of concern that defendant denials would create 
“an impression that a [resolution was being entered into] when the conduct alleged 
did not, in fact, occur.”156 No-admit/no-deny has been criticized by courts and 
scholars because of its lack of admissions, leading to a change in SEC policy in 2013 
to require admissions in some cases.157 But DOJ currently does not even go so far as 
                                                   
152 Id. at 127–28 (citing PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, 
AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 202 (1995)). 
153 Krause, supra note 145, at 216. 
154 See, e.g., Federal Settlement Agreement at 4, United States ex rel. Cretaro-Williams 
v. Dermatology Associates of Central New York, PLCC, et al., No. 15-cv-00315-TJM-ATB, 
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/press-release/file/1117066/ 
download [https://perma.cc/7KSW-SRXT]. 
155 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Skilled Nursing Facility, supra note 126; U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., Union General Hospital, supra note 125.  
156 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2018). 
157 See, e.g., SEC. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F.Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F.Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Rakoff, 
J.) (criticizing the SEC’s former admissions policy because it deprives courts of assurance 
that the relief they are asked to impose has any basis in fact). While there is debate regarding 
the impact of the 2013 policy change, there is a striking difference in the attention paid to 
the debate over admissions in the context of SEC resolutions as compared to FCA 
settlements. See David Rosenfeld, Admissions in SEC Enforcement Cases: The Revolution 
that Wasn’t, 103 IOWA L. REV. 113, 122–26 (2017) (noting SEC’s 2013 change in policy and 
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forbidding defendants from denying wrongdoing when resolving most FCA cases. 
This DOJ policy, too, fuels industry skepticism regarding the legitimacy of 
settlements and similarly weakens DOJ’s efforts at general deterrence.158 
Because FCA settlements have, in almost all cases, done nothing to prevent 
defendants from making public statements proclaiming their innocence, companies 
have publicly claimed their settlements were coerced and illegitimate.159 As noted 
above,160 several of the defendants who received multipliers of 1.0—solely paying 
restitution without any additional payment to even cover the lost interest, cost of 
investigation, or relator’s share, all of which must be taken into account under the 
FCA Guidance—affirmatively denied they had violated the False Claims Act.161 
Both from a deterrence perspective and a legitimacy perspective, Congress and DOJ 
have recognized the harm which results from industry sentiment that FCA 
settlements are simply a cost of doing business, and have sought to push back on 
that view.162 
 
D.  Lack of Sufficiently Detailed Guidance & Transparency 
 
Issuance of the FCA Guidance has sharpened the focus on how reductions from 
FCA multipliers are determined, but at the heart of the problem is a lack of guidance 
as to how multipliers should be determined in the absence of compliant behaviors. 
The data demonstrates that this has resulted in a lack of uniformity across the 
country, with U.S. Attorney’s Offices—whether intentionally or unintentionally—
seemingly calculating resolutions differently when the Commercial Litigation 
Branch is not involved. As DOJ has noted, consistency among prosecutors is critical 
to perceptions of fairness and is best accomplished through transparency—an 
important tool not only externally—to guide industry and the defense bar—but also 
internally, to ensure prosecutors are acting predictably. 163 
                                                   
questioning its impact). 
158 Ayla Ellison, Identifying Trends in False Claims Act Enforcement, BECKER’S HOSP. 
REV. (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulatory-
issues/identify-trends-in-false-claims-act-enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/4P64-YHAJ] 
(“For some in the healthcare industry, civil settlements are treated more like a cost of doing 
business than a true deterrent to fraudulent conduct.” (quoting Shannon DeBra)). 
159 Robert Holly, Encompass Health to Pay $48M to Settle False Claims Allegations, 
HOME HEALTH CARE NEWS (July 1, 2019), https://homehealthcarenews.com/2019/07/encom 
pass-health-to-pay-48m-to-settle-false-claims-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/KH6J-B8HT] 
(“‘The evidence establishes that Encompass Health did nothing wrong,’ [Mark Tarr, 
president and CEO of Encompass Health] said in a statement. ‘But to stop this interminable 
investigation and avoid further expense, we decided it is in the best interests of Encompass 
Health and its shareholders to settle with DOJ and end the related litigation.’”). 
160 See supra Section III.F. 
161 See, e.g., Ellison, supra note 129; Stempniak, supra note 129; Marr, supra note 129. 
162 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Respironics to Pay $34.8 Million, supra note 134. 
163 See Global Investigations Review Live, supra note 12 (“Internally, at the Department 
of Justice, transparency helps define and refine the criteria prosecutors will apply to key 
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The potential that the qui tam system incentivizes U.S. Attorney’s Offices to 
behave differently than the Commercial Litigation Branch, and may incentivize U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices, in particular, to inadequately provide compliant behavior 
benefits, further demonstrates the need for a defined multiplier calculation structure.  
DOJ’s recent efforts to incentivize compliant behaviors through the 
transparency of the FCA Guidance cannot achieve its desired effect in its current 
state. The FCA Guidance laid out publicly, for the first time, the factors that might 
warrant a reduction in a multiplier, but it lacks specificity as to how such reductions 
should apply. And while the FCA Guidance notes that DOJ may “publicly 
acknowledge the entity’s [] disclosure, other cooperation, or remediation” as an 
“additional avenue[] that would permit an entity [] to claim credit in FCA cases,” 
without a policy of showing its work—laying out multiplier calculations in CSAs as 
they are in criminal resolution documents—industry and the defense bar have no 
means by which to judge the extent of the benefit received even where DOJ 
acknowledges compliant behaviors. 
At a minimum, the analysis makes clear that if DOJ wishes to achieve its oft-
stated goal of incentivizing business organization cooperation and investments in 
compliance programs, DOJ must increase the level of transparency and guidance—
a fact DOJ has clearly understood when it comes to motivating compliant behaviors, 
self-disclosure in particular, in the context of the FCPA and other criminal 
prosecutions.164 With the criminal-side trend towards increased transparency and 
defined benefits evident in the Corporate Enforcement Policy, the transparency gap 
between criminal and civil has been thrown into sharp relief. 
Criminal DOJ officials have spoken explicitly about the need for transparency 
in resolutions in order to overcome industry skepticism. In a December 2019 
interview with the Wall Street Journal, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
overseeing DOJ’s Criminal Division pointed to transparency as DOJ’s mechanism 
to show industry that DOJ is following its own guidance—“if we don’t do that, the 
policies will ring hollow.”165 That is precisely the risk facing DOJ’s FCA 
enforcement. 
 
                                                   
decisions. . . . Having internal guidance that is both clear and clearly memorialized helps to 
ensure consistency and predictability in how those standards are applied within the 
Department.”). 
164 See generally Peter R. Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate 
Transnational Bribery Worldwide: Federal Transparency and Voluntary Disclosure Under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1683 (2015) (arguing, prior to issuance 
of the FCPA Pilot Program, that the government should be more transparent regarding 
specific and calculable benefits that can be achieved through self-reporting and cooperation 
in the face of FCPA violations). 
165 Dylan Tokar, How the Justice Department Incentivizes Companies to Invest in 
Compliance, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-
justice-department-incentivizes-companies-to-invest-in-compliance-11577183403 
[https://perma.cc/6QDD-N6XB]. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
With changes in the tax law providing a glimpse into DOJ’s handling of FCA 
settlements at the same time as DOJ’s criminal prosecutors have moved aggressively 
and publicly towards increased transparency in rewarding compliant behaviors, 
DOJ’s corporate enforcement is at a crossroads—DOJ must either increase the 
structure and transparency surrounding its handling of FCA matters or risk a further 
decline in industry trust in the fairness of DOJ policy. By documenting and applying 
a structure to the calculation of FCA settlements, DOJ has the opportunity to 
improve the relationship between DOJ and industry and create deterrence far beyond 
what can be achieved through individual enforcement actions. Without change in 
this area, DOJ risks undercutting its efforts at encouraging compliant behavior in 
one of DOJ’s primary enforcement areas. 
To the extent DOJ is already appropriately rewarding compliant behavior in 
civil FCA resolutions, adopting such a framework and including the math in public 
settlement agreements would come at no cost and would provide assurance of 
consistency among cases handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country. 
Revealing restitution figures while making no further comment on calculation 
methodology, however, will continue to lead to speculation and misinformation. 
Instead, DOJ should take the opportunity to reexamine its approach, both to how it 
calculates FCA settlements internally and as to its historic unwillingness to be 
transparent about its calculations. By adopting a structure of calculating the 
appropriate amount of civil settlements modeled, in general terms, on U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines § 8C (including increases based on the severity of the 
misconduct and the level of those involved, and decreases based on compliant 
behavior and acceptance of responsibility, among other factors), DOJ can 
incentivize compliant behavior while also taking the opportunity to explain 
settlements to the public and industry. 
DOJ is likely to be resistant to such a change not only because of institutional 
inertia but possibly also because of some of the same issues which have caused 
critics to question DOJ’s use of the FCA—the currently large settlement benefit 
creates enormous pressure on defendants to settle. The lack of transparency allows 
the government to reduce settlement demands based on litigation risk without doing 
so explicitly and being forced to acknowledge publicly when it sees weaknesses in 
its litigation position.166 But none of these grounds are a reason to avoid what would 
be a positive development, and DOJ has never publicly stated why it has avoided 
providing this information. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8C framework 
reduces fines by 20–40% based on acceptance of responsibility, and those 
percentages could be increased with regard to civil matters if that is viewed as 
                                                   
166 Litigation risk might explain some of the resolutions with low multipliers where the 
evidence points away from there having been compliant behavior. Litigation risk as a silent 
factor would not explain the overall distribution of multipliers, however, as one would expect 
to see more resolutions with higher multipliers in cases without significant litigation risk. 
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desirable (as DOJ has done with cooperation and self-disclosure in the context of 
the Corporate Enforcement Policy on the criminal side). And an ideal calculation 
structure would allow for sufficient flexibility to permit consideration of litigation 
risk, just as the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8C framework leads to a range with a 
maximum twice its minimum, and looks to a series of more amorphous factors to 
determine a specific fine within that range, or even beyond it in unusual cases.167 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the Corporate Enforcement Policy have not 
forsaken all art in the name of science, but provide sufficient transparency to allow 
both for discussion of the merits of various additions and reductions and to allow 
industry to engage in some calculation of risks and benefits. 
If, on the other hand, DOJ is resistant because it has not been rewarding 
compliant behavior in resolving civil FCA cases, a change in this area is even more 
important. Doing so would constitute a short-term view—prioritizing short-term 
dollar recoveries (and press releases) over broad, long-term deterrence. Through an 
appropriate calculation methodology for FCA matters, DOJ can rectify the lack of 
appropriate incentives for compliant behavior currently present in the health care 
industry. Through transparency, DOJ can create a framework for an appropriate 
dialogue regarding the appropriate level at which compliant behavior should be 
rewarded, and the lack of compliant behavior should be punished. 
  
                                                   
167 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.8 (2004) (includes factors that the 
court is required to consider under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) & 3572(a), in addition to other 
factors). 
1216 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
APPENDIX 1 
HEALTH CARE FCA SETTLEMENTS 
 
 All Multiplier ID’d 
All 118 89 
Involved CLB 44 (37%) 36 (40%) 
USAO-only 74 (63%) 453 (60%) 
 
Qui Tam 77 (65%) 55 (62%) 
No Qui Tam 41 (35%) 
 
34 (38%) 
Mean Multiplier168 n/a 1.78 (0.45)  
 





Multiplier = 2.0169 n/a 44 
Multiplier < 2.0 n/a 34 
Multiplier ≤ 1.5170 n/a 26 
   
Q1 n/a 1.5 
Median n/a 2.0 
Q3 n/a 2.0 
 
APPENDIX 2 
RESOLUTIONS INVOLVING CLB VS. USAO-ONLY (MULTIPLIER ID’D) 
 
 Involved CLB USAO-only 
Multiplier ID’d 36 (40%) 53 (60%) 
Mean Resolution $34,857,974 $7,404,954 
Mean for Multiplier ID’d171 1.66 (0.458) 1.86 (0.429) 
Variance 0.21 0.18 
p value172 0.037*  
 
 
                                                   
168 Value in parentheses is standard deviation. 
169 Multipliers were rounded to the nearest tenth for purposes of categorization. Thus, 
any multiplier below 2.05 but greater than or equal to 1.95 was considered 2.0 for purposes 
of categorization. 
170 Multipliers were rounded to the nearest tenth for purposes of categorization. Thus, 
any multiplier below 1.55 but greater than or equal to 1.45 was considered 1.5 for purposes 
of categorization. 
171 Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
172 Significant at 5% level. 
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APPENDIX 3 
USAO-ONLY RESOLUTIONS: QUI TAM VS. NO QUI TAM (MULTIPLIER ID’D) 
 
 No Qui Tam Qui Tam 
Multiplier ID’d 22 31 
Mean Resolution $3,667,780 $10,057,142 
Mean for Multiplier ID’d173 1.74 (0.453) 1.95 (0.394) 
Variance 0.20 0.15 
p value174 0.069  
 
                                                   
173 Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
174 Significant at 10% level. 
